Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability by Burkhart, Ann
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1988 
Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability 
Ann Burkhart 
University of Minnesota Law School, burkh002@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ann Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317 (1988), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/252. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
ARTICLE
LENDER/OWNERS AND CERCLA:
TITLE AND LIABILITY
ANN M. BURKHART*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA) represents Congress' response to the problem of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites. The Act and its related regulations
authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) either to order the
responsible parties to contain the hazardous waste on the site or to clean
the site and charge the responsible parties for EPA's response costs. An
unresolved issue is whether these provisions contemplate holding a lenderi
owner liable for response costs.
In this Article, Professor Burkhart rebuts challenges to.lenderlowner
liability. She begins by scrutinizing the language and legislative history of
the liability provisions and their exceptions and reviewing the relevant
environmental case law. Sie then considers constitutional challenges to
lenderlowner liability. Next, she reviews common law bases of liability.
Professor Burkhart concludes that lenderlowners should be held liable for
response costs under CERCLA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The hazardous waste disposal problem has reached a disas-
trous level in America. Only recently have studies demonstrated
the magnitude of the environmental problem, not only in terms
of the large number of dump sites that are polluting our air and
water, but also in terms of the effects of these toxics on human
beings and their habitats. Evidence has established a causal link
between toxic chemical exposure and such health problems as
cancer, birth defects, and personality disorders.' Dramatic large-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. B.S., Purdue
University, 1973; M.S., Purdue University, 1974; J.D., University of Illinois, 1977.
1 C. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, CLEANING UP
HAZARDOUS WASTES: AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES, GAO/
RCED-85-69 5-7 (1985) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT); 126 CONG. REC.
26,208 (1980) (statement of Rep. Ratchford (D-Conn.)); J. Moorman, Land and Natural
Resources Division, Dep't of Justice, The Superfund Concept: Report of the Interagency
Task Force on Compensation and Liability for Releases of Hazardous Substances 5-9,
(June 1979) [hereinafter The Superfund Concept] (on file at the Harvard Journal on
Legislation). See also Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94
HARV. L. REV. 584, 584 n.1 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Allocating Costs]:
In one case, chemicals allegedly migrating from a dump site included dioxin,
which produces cancer, birth defects, and mutations; tetrachloroethylene, a
carcinogen that has adverse effects on the central nervous system; and chlo-
roform, which causes narcosis of the central nervous system, destruction of
liver cells, kidney damage, harmful alterations of blood chemistry, and cardiac
problems.
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scale environmental disasters, such as those that occurred at
Love Canal and at Times Beach, 2 have impressed upon the
American public the potentially catastrophic proportions of the
problem. Federal, state, and local governments also have felt
the impact, not only in human terms, but also in economic
terms; the Love Canal cleanup alone has cost the government
more than $30 million, whereas proper disposal practices might
have amounted to only $3 to $4 million at the time of disposal. 3
A University of California public health physician has estimated that 6% of all cancer
deaths in California are caused by toxic chemical exposure. 131 CONG. REc. H1I,1l1
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Fazio (D-Cal.)). Representative Fazio also
noted toxic chemicals' substantial negative impact on the environment. For example,
in San Francisco Bay, the reduction in the striped bass population, which is at least
partially attributable to toxic pollutants, costs California's fishing industry several billion
dollars per year. Id. Some experts, however, believe that the health risks from toxic
chemical exposure are minimal. See, e.g., Ames, Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible
Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271 (1987).
2 On May 21, 1980, President Carter declared a Federal emergency at the Love Canal
in Niagara Falls, New York, the site of chemical dumping by the Hooker Chemical and
Plastics Corporation from 1942 to 1953. Nearly 1000 families were evacuated, and the
State and Federal Governments provided funds to buy contaminated properties. Mol-
otsky, President Orders Emergency Help for Love Canal, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1980,
at Al, col. 2; Actions at the Love Canal Site, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1980, at A19, col.
6.
On February 23, 1983, the Federal Government announced its intention to spend
$33 million to buy back all homes in Times Beach, Missouri, a town contaminated by
dioxin sprayed on its streets some ten years earlier. Reinhold, U.S. Offers to Buy all
Homes Tainted by Dioxin, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
3 126 CONG. REC. 26,338 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio (D-N.J.)). In calculating its
fiscal 1988 budget request, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated an
average cleanup cost of $10-$12 million per site. Justice Official Tells BNA Conference
that PRPs Deserve Access to Superfund Sites, [Current Developments] 17 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 2049, 2050 (Apr. 3, 1987). The Director of the Division of Solid and
Hazardous Waste for the New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation esti-
mated an average cleanup cost of more than $15 million per site. Id. One federal agency
has stated that cost estimates for cleaning a site range from $-$30 million. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 61 (1985). See also H.R. REP. No.
253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 256, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2835, 2930-31 (statement of Rep. Scheuer (D-N.Y.)):
Chevron spent $10 to $12 million to resolve the liability for cleaning up a
30,000-gallon gasoline leak. In 1978, Exxon spent between $5 and $10 million
as a result of leak [sic] in East Meadow, New York. Estimates for liability
resulting from such underground gasoline leaks range as high as $25 million.
Id. at 2930-31; 126 CONG. REc. 25,100 (1980) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt (D-Tex.))
(In one year "the Justice Department has filed a total of 40 suits for remedial work with
an estimated cost of between $330 million and $590 million. While these statistics hint
at the size of the problem, they are merely the tip of the iceberg."); The Superfund
Concept, supra note 1, at 11 (estimated per site cleanup cost of $25.9 million). The cost
estimates for rehabilitating the most dangerous sites that have been discovered to date
are enormous.
EPA has estimated that the total price tag for cleaning up the nation's worst
abandoned hazardous waste sites could run as high as $46 billion .... [The]
GAO has estimated that the federal share of cleanup could run as high as
$39 billion, with private parties paying roughly equivalent amounts to complete
cleanup. The Office of Technology Assessment estimates the total cleanup
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The pervasive use of hazardous chemicals in commerce and the
virtual absence of effective methods for permanent disposal of
hazardous wastes guarantee that the problem will be of continu-
ing importance. 4
price tag at roughly $100 billion, counting both public and private sector con-
tributions to such costs.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 278, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2953. See also id. at 257, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 2931-32; COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
4 As of January 23, 1987, EPA has included 703 sites on the National Priorities List
(NPL) and has proposed 248 additional sites for listing. EPA Seeks Comments on 64
Proposed Sites to be Added to the National Priorities List, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
41, at 1725 (Feb. 6, 1987). Once listed on the NPL, a site is eligible for Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) cleanup funds,
more commonly known as "Superfund." Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2781 (1980) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)), amended by Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (100 Stat.) 1760-74 [hereinafter all citations to CERCLA, or "the Act," will be
to the U.S. Code and Supplement]. The NPL includes only those discovered sites that
pose the greatest threat to human health and to the environment. The magnitude of the
total problem is better demonstrated by EPA's hazardous waste site inventory, which
includes approximately 20,000 sites that may pose a threat to human health and to the
environment. CERCLA Enforcement Figures Called Low for Fiscal 1986, [Decisions]
25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at front cover, inside front cover (Nov. 28, 1986). Senator
Stafford (R-Vt.) has stated that the actual number of such sites could be 378,000:
[Tihe General Accounting Office [GAO] has reported that the potential universe
of Superfund sites in fact could be much larger then [sic] previously acknowl-
edged, and could include some 378,000 facilities. The GAO report concluded
that relatively little emphasis has been given to site discovery. Aside from the
initial effort in 1982 which uncovered most of the sites on the current inventory,
the Federal Government has relied primarily on local governments and the
public to discover new sites. It has not conducted any other systematic dis-
covery effort. According to the GAO report, the Environmental Protection
Agency has acknowleged [sic] that a targeted, systematic discovery effort
combined with a change in program emphasis toward cleaning up sites that
have not yet received sufficient attention, could increase the number of sites
well beyond the 25,000 figure. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency acknowledged in the report that there are some 34,000 to 52,000
municipal landfills and some 9,770 to 63,770 mining waste sites not yet been
listed [sic] or evaluated under the Superfund Program.
132 CONG. REc. S14,896 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
Despite general knowledge of the injuries and costs caused by improper disposal, the
problem is worsening. EPA estimated that of some 57 million metric tons of hazardous
waste produced in 1980, as much as 90% was disposed of in an environmentally unsound
manner. 126 CONG. REC. 26,339 (1980) (statement of Rep. Staggers (D-W. Va.)). For
example, Representative Ambro (D-N.Y.) stated in floor debates that, during 1978,
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. dumped more than 1,600,000 pounds of industrial
wastes in a landfill. "Despite Hooker's knowledge that these wastes were largely haz-
ardous and constitute a threat to human health as they leach into the ground water
supply, there was no surveillance by the corporation of the site." 126 CONG. REc. 26,351
(1980) (statement of Rep. Ambro). EPA has now banned land disposal of some of the
most toxic wastes. See U.S. Industry in Midst of Profound Change in Management of
Hazardous Waste, Florio Says, [Current Developments] 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47
at 1919 (Mar. 20, 1987). See also Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1458, 1462 (1986) [hereinafter Toxic Waste Note].
The severity of the problem also results in part from the pervasive use of hazardous
320 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 25:317
In response to the problem of improper hazardous waste
disposal, Congress in 1980 enacted the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),5 often referred to as "Superfund," 6 and in 1986, the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 7
Among other provisions, CERCLA authorizes the government
not only to rehabilitate hazardous waste sites, but also to re-
co¢er its costs and other specified damages from the entities
specified in subsection 107(a). 8
substances. According to Representative Breaux (D-La.), EPA has identified more than
4,000 types of businesses and industries that have contributed waste to now abandoned
hazardous waste sites. "EPA's list of potential responsible parties who have actually
caused the problem run from automobiles, banking, electronics and electrical manufac-
turing, furniture, aircraft and aerospace, optical products, computers, food, beverage
and grocery manufacturers, paper and packaging product companies, airlines, rubber
products, communications, textiles, and utilities." 131 CONG. REc. H1l,080 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Breaux). Representative Moore (R-La.) has stated that
EPA attributes only 13% of toxic waste sites to chemical companies' disposal practices.
The remaining sites are created by a spectrum of users that normally are not considered
to be in the business of generating hazardous wastes. According to Representative
Moore, an EPA investigation of a hazardous waste site in Zionsville, Indiana revealed
waste contributors that included Eli Lilly, Fred's Frozen Food, Coca-Cola, University
of Minnesota, and the Indianapolis Department of Public Works. 131 CONG. REc.
Hl1,106 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Moore). See also 132 CONG. REC.
S14,908 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen (D-Tex.)).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. H 1984).
6 Although the term "Superfund" is popularly used to refer to CERCLA in its entirety,
the term more accurately applies to the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund
that Congress established through CERCLA for the payment of governmental response
costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1982).
7 To provide EPA with the funds necessary for its investigations, remedial actions,
and law suits against responsible parties, CERCLA provided for taxation of certain
industries that generate hazardous substances. This funding mechanism expired on
September 30, 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 9653 (1982). Unable to reach agreement on the terms
of a reauthorization bill, Congress subsequently enacted two stopgap appropriation bills
in 1985: Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, Repayable Advance, Pub. L. No.
99-270, 100 Stat. 80 (1986); Superfund Extension, Pub. L. No. 99-411, 100 Stat. 931
(1986). In October 1986, it enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA), which, among other provisions, extended funding for an additional five
years. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1760-74.
1 Section 107(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
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The magnitude of damage caused by improperly disposed
hazardous wastes and the enormous cost of cleaning up contam-
inated waste sites prompted Congress to cast a broad net of
liability in subsection 107(a). 9 Among those caught in this net
are "innocent" lender/owners-secured lenders who have ac-
quired encumbered property without having participated in the
dumping activities and who have not continued them. Potential
liability of innocent lender/owners most often arises when a
lender forecloses on property in which it holds a security interest
and purchases the property at the foreclosure sale or when a
lender accepts a deed to the property in settlement of the se-
cured debt.
CERCLA has proven to be an unexpected source of
liability for lenders, because this is the first time that a
government agency has pursued lender/owners in court for
conditions on the property. Although other federal0 and
disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is
a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 104(i).
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the
amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West Supp. 1987) (addition
of subparagraph D).
9 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
'0 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6) (1982):
"[O]wner or operator" means (A) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, and (B) in the case of an
onshore facility, and an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
onshore facility or offshore facility, and (C) in the case of any abandoned
offshore facility, the person who owned or operated such facility immediately
prior to such abandonment.
Deepwater Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(m)(4) (1982) ("'[O]wner or operator' means any
person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, a vessel."); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 741 l(a)(5) (1982) ("The term 'owner or operator' means any person who owns, leases,
operates, controls, or supervises a stationary source."); Outer Continental Shelf Re-
source Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1811(19) (1982):
"[O]wner" means any person holding title to, or in the absence of title, any
other indicia of ownership of, a vessel or offshore facility, whether by lease,
permit, contract, license, or other form of agreement, or with respect to any
offshore facility abandoned without prior approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, the person who owned such offshore facility immediately prior to such
abandonment, except that such term does not include a person who, without
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state1 environmental acts and regulations include a list of po-
tentially liable parties that is similar to that contained in CER-
participating in the management or operation of a vessel or offshore facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or offshore facility.
Financial Responsibility for Oil Pollution-Alaska Pipeline, 33 C.F.R. § 131.20) (1986)
("'Owner' or 'vessel owner' means any person holding legal or equitable title to a
vessel; Provided, however, That a person holding legal or equitable title to a vessel
solely as security is not an owner." (emphasis in original)); Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment System: General, 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1986) ("'Owner' means the person who
owns a facility or part of a facility.").
" See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Re-
sponse Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 2 (1986):
"Owner" or "Operator", (1) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, oper-
ating or chartering by demise such vessel, (2) in the case of a site, any person
owning or operating such site, and (3) in the case of an abandoned site, any
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such site
immediately prior to such abandonment. The term shall not include a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or site holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in said vessel or site.
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN. STAT. § I15B.02(11)
(1987):
"Owner of real property" means a person who is in possession of, has the right
of control, or controls the use of real property .... provided that:
*.. (3) Any person holding a remainder or other nonpossessory interest or
estate in real property is an owner of the real property beginning when that
person's interest or estate in the real property vests in possession or that
person obtains the unconditioned right to possession, or to control the use
of, the real property.
New Hampshire Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:2(VI)
(Equity Supp. 1987) ("'Generator' means any person who owns or operates a facility
where hazardous waste is generated."); New Jersey Major Hazardous Waste Facilities
Siting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IE-51(n) (West Supp. 1987) ("[I]n addition to the usual
meanings thereof, every owner of record of any interest in land whereon a major
hazardous waste facility is or has been located, and any person or corporation which
owns a majority interest in any other corporation which is the owner or operator... );
New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.llb(n)
(West Supp. 1987):
"Owner" or "operator" means with respect to a vessel, any person owning,
operating or chartering by demise such vessel; with respect to any major
facility, any person owning such facility, or operating it by lease, contract or
other form of agreement; with respect to abandoned or derelict major facilities,
the person who owned or operated such facility immediately prior to such
abandonment, or the owner at the time of discharge.
North Carolina Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-215.77(12) (1983) ("'Operator' shall mean any person owning or operating an oil
terminal facility or pipeline, whether by lease, contract, or any other form of
agreement.").
Interestingly, the Massachusetts and Minnesota Acts impose liability on the "owner
or operator." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5(a) (1987) (emphasis added), and MINN. STAT.
§ 115B.03(1) (1986) (emphasis added). Conversely, CERCLA imposes liability on the
"owner and operator." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). See infra notes
37-61 and accompanying text.
Many other states have enacted legislation imposing liability for hazardous waste
cleanup costs. Although only the state acts listed supra actually define "owner," several
other state acts impose liability on the property owner. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.877(3), (4), (6)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
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CLA, no reported decision exists in which the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) or another authorized plaintiff has
pursued a lender inside or outside the courtroom. Consequently,
when two CERCLA cost recovery actions were filed against
lenders that had held security interests in properties that EPA
cleaned of hazardous wastes, 12 shock waves reverberated
through the lending industry. Business journal articles and con-
tinuing legal education programs have since warned lenders of
this unexpected source of liability and have counseled methods
for attempting to avoid it.13
Lenders have been particularly concerned about the prospect
of CERCLA liability. First, the cost of cleaning a hazardous
waste site, especially when combined with the other elements
of CERCLA damages, often and substantially exceeds the
amount the lender agreed to invest against the security of the
property. Indeed, such damage amounts often exceed the fair
market value of the land even after it is cleaned of hazardous
wastes. In such a case, a lender faces the possibility of a much
greater economic burden than was anticipated when it made a
loan secured by the contaminated property.
Second, many insurance companies have taken the position
that commonly used comprehensive general liability policies do
not include liability for hazardous waste related injuries and
38, § 1319-3 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.541 (West 1984); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(3)(a) (Consol. Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3734.22 (Anderson Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-60(b)(1)-(c)(2) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987); Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7,
§ 8(g)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Texas Hazardous Substances Spill Prevention and
Control Act, TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.263(6) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 144.76(3), (7) (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the impact of state haz-
ardous waste laws on real estate transactions, see Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding
Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and its Impact on Business Transactions,
8 CORP. L. REv. 101, 106-08 (1985); Dean, How State Hazardous Waste 'Statutes
Influence Real Estate Transactions, [Current Developments] 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
14, at 933 (July 31, 1987).
12 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
11 See, e.g., Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 11, at 113; Apple & Guthrie, Caveat
Emptor When it Comes to Super Fund Liability, MINN. L.J. 11 (1987); Bleicher &
Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate
Transactions, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envfl. L. Inst.) No. 1, at 10,017 (Jan. 1984); Burcat,
Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other
Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986); Richman & Stukane, Avoiding the Envi-
ronmental Risks in Mortgage Transactions, 2 REAL EST. FIN. J. 13 (Winter 1987); Shea,
Protecting Lenders Aqainst Environmental Risks, PR.AC. REAL EST. LAW. 11 (May
1987); Berz & Sexton, Superfund Collides with Lenders' Concerns, Legal Times, Dec.
23-30, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
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cleanup costs. As a result, a lender that believed it was com-
prehensively covered against liability confronts the possibility
of being a self-insurer for a large unanticipated liability.14
Surprisingly in light of the effects on lenders, Congress ap-
parently did not consider the issue of lender/owner liability when
it enacted CERCLA. Despite hundreds of pages of legislative
history, 5 not one reference exists to the lender/owner's potential
liability. 16 More surprisingly, SARA's legislative history also
does not mention the issue although the opinions in earlier
14 For a discussion of the insurance issues that have arisen with respect to environ-
mental liability, see Adler & Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social
Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
1251 (1986); Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 114; Bauer & Lakind, Toward
Resolution of Insurance Coverage Questions in Toxic Tort Litigation, 38 RUTOERS L.
Rzv. 677 (1986); Toxic Waste Note, supra note 4, at 1573-85; Note, The Pollution
Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L,
REv. 897; Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage for Violations of Antipollution
Laws, 88 A.L.R.3d 182 (1978).
Is It is somewhat inaccurate to refer to CERCLA's legislative history.
Although Congress had worked on "Superfund" toxic and hazardous waste
cleanup bills and on parallel oil spill bills for over three years, the actual bill
which became law had virtually no legislative history at all. The bill which
became law was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan leadership group of
senators (with some assistance from their House counterparts), introduced,
and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other pending measures on the subject.
It was then placed before the House, in the form of a Senate amendment of
the earlier House bill. It was considered on December 3, 1980, in the closing
days of the lame duck session of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and
passed, after very limited debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation
which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take it-
or-leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVmL. L. 1, 1 (1982)
(footnote omitted). See also Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste
Control, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 253 (1981). Because of the limited time Congress had to
consider CERCLA, no committee reports exist for the law as enacted. The floor debates
constitute the only directly related legislative history. See Bulk Distrib. Centers v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("CERCLA's legislative history
is riddled with uncertainty because lawmakers hastily drafted the bill and because last
minute compromises forced changes that went largely unexplained.") (dicta). For this
reason, one court has advised that "the Committee Reports must be read with some
caution." United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn.
1982).
16 One Representative focused on the problem of lenders refusing loans to companies
that may be subject to CERCLA liability, but he did not address the problem of the
lenders' potential liability.
Financial institutions are extremely wary of lending capital for operations when
the borrower may or may not be subject to huge liabilities created by the legal
disposal of hazardous waste. The impact of this ripples through the economy
as small business finds itself unable to borrow needed capital for expansion
and investment due to the contingent liabilities generated under the CERCLA
liability system.
131 CONG. REc. HlI,091 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Brown (R-Colo.)).
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CERCLA suits involving lender/owners were published before
SARA became law.17
The references in the legislative histories concerning the
scope of liability provide little insight into whether or to what
extent Congress intended lender/owners to be subject to CER-
CLA liability. Although some statements in the legislative his-
tory indicate that Congress may have intended to impose liabil-
ity only on an entity that generated, transported, or permitted
dumping of hazardous materials,1 8 other relevant policy state-
ments indicate that Congress did not intend to limit liability in
this way.19 The legislative history includes statements by several
17 According to one commentator, the lenders' lobby did attempt to have Congress
exempt lender/owners from liability.
Although bank lobbies attempted to persuade members of Congress to include
in section 101(35) of the 1986 Superfund amendments a provision exempting
mortgagees from liability when they acquire possession of land by foreclosure,
members of the Senate were so hostile to the idea that it was never even
formally considered in committee.
Telephone interview with Robert Norris, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Barney
Frank (D-Mass.) (Nov. 14, 1986). Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical As-
sessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879, 904 n.139 (1987). While Congress considered the
1986 amendments, the Federal Home Loan Corporation, a major purchaser in the
secondary mortgage market, proposed an alternative definition of "contractual relation-
ship" that would insulate a lender/owner from CERCLA liability if it did not have notice
of the hazardous wastes when it made the loan secured by the polluted land. Id. at 907-
08.
18 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S14,934 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger (R-Minn.)) ("[Superfund] imposed strict,joint, and several liability on those
who manufacture, handle, and dispose of hazardous substances."); S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Letter from Douglas Costle to Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.),
(Sept. 25, 1979):
The supposition of the Administration's proposal is that society should not
bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards produced in the past by a
generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator who has
profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these substances and
now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for the present
hazards to society that have been created;
126 CoNG. REc. 26,358 (1980) (statement of Rep. Findley (R-Ill.)) ("[H.R. 7020 would]
... establish strict lines of liability for those who engage in the waste disposal busi-
ness."); 126 CONG. REC. 26,339 (statement of Rep. Staggers (D-W. Va.)) ("[H.R. 7020]
provides that defendants who caused or contributed to hazardous waste situations
necessitating response action by the Administrator shall be strictly, jointly and severally
liable for the costs of such action."); 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Randolph) ("The purposes of [S. 1480] were: First, to make those who release hazardous
substances strictly liable for cleanup costs, mitigation, and third-party damages .... ).
The last two quotations can be interpreted as including a property owner who did not
operate the dump and did not authorize anyone else to do so but, having failed to clean
the site of hazardous wastes thereby necessitating an EPA cleanup, has "contributed
to" and permitted the "release" of hazardous substances.
19 See, e.g., Senator Lautenberg's (R-N.J.) statements with respect to the CERCLA
reauthorization bill:
Cleaning up these sites will be expensive. It will require assigning liability to
the parties who contributed to the creation of these sites. And, it will require
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members of Congress to the effect that "polluters should pay"20
or that the parties "responsible" for a hazardous waste release
should be liable. 2'
These statements are consistent with the statutory imposition
of liability on a property owner that acquired a dump site but
did not operate the dump, such as a lender/owner. Imposition
of liability is, moreover, consistent with traditional precepts of
property law. Historically, a property owner has been legally
responsible for a hazardous condition existing on its land even
if it did not create the condition. In this sense, the owner is
deemed to be a tort-feasor. Although it did not create the haz-
ardous condition, the owner is permitting the condition on its
land to harm others. 22
In the absence of a clear congressional expression of intent
concerning a lender/owner's liability for the cost of cleaning up
a hazardous waste site, the resolution of the issue turns on the
statutory language and that language's relationship with the pol-
icies underlying CERCLA. This Article will analyze CERCLA's
liability provisions and will demonstrate that Congress intended
that a lender/owner may be held liable for response costs. This
Article then will establish that this potential imposition of lia-
bility is constitutional and is consistent with a landowner's-
a financial contribution from a range of parties, some of whom may not have
contributed directly to our toxic waste problem, but all of whom have benefited
from the products produced by the chemical and petroleum industries.
132 CONG. Rec. S14,911 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
20 See, e.g., 132 CONG. Rc. S14,932 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Wallop (R-Wyo.)) ("The cost of cleaning environmental problems should be based on
the principle that the polluter should pay."); id. at S14,923 (statement of Sen. Chafee
(R-R.I.)) ("[The funding proposal] is consistent with the principle of Superfund: the
principle that the polluter pays."); 131 CONG. REC. HI,118 (daly ed. Dec. 5, 1985)
(statement of Rep. Traficant (D-Ohio)) ("Polluters should pay the entire cost of cleaning
the mess they created and the grave hazards they caused.").
21 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S14,934 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) ("When it was adopted in 1980, Superfund was designed to assure that
those who are responsible for the release of hazardous substances into the environment
would also bear the responsibility of responding to the threats that those substances
pose. That was the theory of Superfund."); 131 CONG. REC. HlI,117 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1985) (Letter to Speaker of the House and Minority Leader from selected Members of
Congress (Dec. 4, 1985) ("Liability is the most effective tool that EPA has for bringing
the responsible parties to the bargaining table to negotiate a cleanup agreement.")); 126
CONG. REC. 26,338 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) ("[The liability provision] assures
that the costs of chemical poison releases are borne by those responsible for the releases.
It creates a strong incentive both for prevention of releases and voluntary cleanup of
releases by responsible parties.").
22 See infra notes 190-237 and accompanying text. The monumental problems of proof
and formidable procedural obstacles, such as statutes of limitations, however, can
prevent recovery by hazardous waste victims. See Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN.
L. REv. 1219 (1987); Toxic Waste Note, supra note 4, at 1604-16.
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including a lender/owner's--common law liability for the con-
dition of its land. Finally, this Article will propose a relaxation
of the usual common law rules concerning apportionment of
damages in CERCLA-related contribution actions to apportion
liability more equitably among the statutorily responsible
parties.
II. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA to deal with hazardous waste
dump sites that are polluting neighboring lands or water sources.
The Act and its related regulations authorize EPA either to order
the responsible parties to contain the hazardous waste on the
site23 or to clean the site and charge the responsible parties for
EPA's response costs. 24 The statutorily defined response costs
include the cost of cleaning the site, any damages for injuries
to natural resources, and the costs of any health assessment or
health effects studies conducted pursuant to statutory author-
ity.2 If EPA cleans the site, it may recover its response costs
from any one or more of the persons enumerated in subsections
107(a)(1)-(4) of the Act, including: (1) the current "owner and
operator" of the waste site;26 (2) any person who owned or
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
4 Id.
2 The recoverable response costs are enumerated in id. § 9607(a). See supra note 8.
- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982). Subsection 107(a)(1) does not specify when a person
must have been the "owner or operator" for liability to attach. It merely provides that
"the owner or operator of a vessel ... or a facility" is liable for CERCLA response
costs. This language can be construed to impose liability on the person who owned
(1) after dumping stopped but before the cleanup, (2) during the cleanup, or (3) when
the cost recovery action is filed. Those persons who owned during any dumping activities
are liable pursuant to § 107(a)(2). Id. § 9607(a)(2). EPA correctly interprets § 107(a)(1)
as imposing liability only on the person who was the owner during the cleanup. S.
Leifer, EPA Deputy Associate Enforcement Counsel for Waste, Office of Enforcement
& Compliance Monitoring, Paper presented at Environmental Risks for Lenders Con-
ference entitled Lender Liability Under CERCLA 2 (June 25, 1987) [hereinafter Leifer
Paper] (on file at the Harvard Journal on Legislation). Courts also have construed
§ 107(a)(1) in the same way. United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (owner at time of cleanup liable); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner at time of cleanup liable although did not
own at time of disposal). This interpretation is consistent with the economics of imposing
liability on an owner who did not participate in or permit dumping. The owner during
the cleanup benefited by the increase in fair market value attributable to the cleanup,
whereas a person who subsequently purchases the property presumably has paid a price
that reflects the uncontaminated value of the property. If the owner during the cleanup
purchased without notice of the waste on the property and paid the uncontaminated
value for the land, it will escape liability pursuant to the third-party defense if it exercised
reasonable care after discovering the waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). Furthermore,
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operated the waste site when any hazardous dumping occurred;
(3) the hazardous waste generators; and (4) the hazardous waste
transporters. 27 Liability for response costs is strict, joint, and
several with limited exception. 28
The terms "owner and operator" in subsection 107(a)(1) are
generic and unmodified. 29 Therefore, a lender that acquires title
to a hazardous waste site, whether by foreclosure or by other
means, potentially is liable for CERCLA response costs even
though the lender did not participate in operation of the site or
in generating or transporting the waste at the site. Liability
follows title as it does under the common law. Under this theory,
lenders who acquired title to encumbered property by foreclo-
sure have been sued as "owners" in two response cost recovery
actions.30 Because lender/owners will usually be easy to locate
the owner during the cleanup, if liable for response costs, could have avoided that
liability by cleaning the site rather than waiting for EPA or another responsible party
to do so. Subsection 9604(a)(1) authorizes the government to clean a hazardous waste
site "unless the President determines that such removal and remedial action will be
done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel or facility from which the release
or threat of release emanates .. " Id. § 9604(a)(1). Note that this alternative is un-
available to a person who acquires the site after a cleanup. Imposing liability on the
owner during the cleanup also is consistent with the common law tort liability of a
landowner, whereas such liability does not attach to a person who acquires property
after the hazardous condition has been eliminated. See infra notes 190-237 and accom-
panying text. No reported decision involves a suit against a person who acquired a
waste site after an EPA cleanup.
The third class of owners, those who did not own during dumping and sold before
the cleanup, were not subject to liability under CERCLA as originally enacted, although
they may be liable pursuant to the CERCLA amendments. In Cadillac Fairview/Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376, 20,378 (C.D.
Cal. 1984), the court stated the pre-SARA law:
This defendant argues on this motion that the scope of liability of the Act is
not so broad as to encompass a party who merely owned the site at a previous
point in time, who neither deposited nor allowed others to deposit hazardous
wastes on the site. This appears to be correct under any but a very strained
reading of the Act.
That former innocent owners were not liable under CERCLA as originally enacted is
further demonstrated by the SARA amendment that provides one circumstance under
which such an owner will be liable for response costs. New § 101(35)(c) provides that
such an owner will be liable if it had actual knowledge of a release or threatened release
from the property but did not disclose that condition to the person who acquired title
from it. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(c) (West Supp. 1987). Such an amendment would have
been unnecessary if this class of owners already were liable under § 107(a)(1).
27 See supra note 8.
28 See infra notes 239-74 and accompanying text. Although courts and commentators
frequently state that CERCLA imposes strict liability, liability is less than strict. An
otherwise responsible party will not be liable for-CERCLA response costs if it can
establish that the hazardous condition was caused solely by an act of God, an act of
war, or an unrelated third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. 111984). The third-
party defense is discussed at infra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
30 See infra notes 89-113 and accompanying text.
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and to join in a response cost recovery action and will generally
have sufficiently deep pockets to pay a judgment against them,
lender/owners will continue to be attractive defendants and
more suits are likely.
If the lender participated in operation of the waste site,
whether before or after acquiring the site, it may be liable as an
"operator." In United States v. Mirabile, for example, a federal
district court stated that a secured lender could incur CERCLA
liability as an "operator" if it had been actively engaged in its
borrowers' business operations.3 1 A lender/owner also bears
potential tort liability for injuries resulting from the condition of
the land and for any failure to disclose that condition when it
sells the land.32
If the lender/owner is not potentially liable as an operator,
but only as an owner, however, it has at least four plausible
arguments to attempt to avoid CERCLA liability: (1) subsection
107(a)(1) imposes liability only on owners that also are opera-
tors; 33 (2) pursuant to an exception in the Act's definition of
"owner or operator," the lender is not liable because it acquired
title primarily to protect its security interest;34 (3) the lender
qualifies for the subsection 107(b)(3) third-party defense; 35 and
(4) imposition of liability on a lender/owner is unconstitutional. 36
As will be demonstrated, the third-party defense is the only
viable argument to avoid liability, and the exception it offers is
narrow.
A. Subsection 107(a)(1)-"The Owner and Operator"
Subsection 107(a)(1) provides that "the owner and operator"
of a waste site is liable for CERCLA response costs. 37 The Act
broadly and circularly defines "the owner or operator" as a
person who owns, operates, charters, or otherwise controls a
315 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,997 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987). See infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
33 See infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
m See infra notes 63-113 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
36See infra notes 146-89 and accompanying text.
- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
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vessel or facility. 38 In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 39 a CERCLA response cost recovery action against, among
others, a lender/owner, the lender/owner argued that subsection
107(a)(1) imposes liability on a property owner only if that per-
son also is an operator. The defendant argued that the conjunc-
tive "and," together with use of the article "the" before the word
"owner" but not before the word "operator," provided that an
owner is liable only if it also is an operator.40
The court was unreceptive to the defendant's grammar-based
argument, noting that "by no means d6es Congress always fol-
low the rules of grammar when enacting the laws of this na-
tion. '41 An authority on statutory construction, as well as a
grammarian, provide support for the court's finding of potential
liability for non-operating owners in the statute's language. 42
With respect to the use of "and" rather than "or," a leading
authority on statutory construction states: "There has been...
[such] great laxity in the use of these terms that courts have
generally said that the words are interchangeable and that one
may be substituted for the other, if consistent with the legislative
intent." 43 With respect to the absence of the second "the" in the
liability provision, H.W. Fowler has stated in his classic work,
A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, that insistence on "the"
being placed before each noun in a series is an example of
"needless rigidity." 44 This type of statutory flyspecking is par-
38 Section 9601(a)(20) provides:
"[O]wner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility,
and (iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated,
or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such
abandonment. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. § 9601(a)(20). The security interest exception is discussed later in this Article. See
infra notes 63-111 and accompanying text.
3' 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (D. Md. 1986).
10 See id. at 577.
4, See id. at 578.
42 See, e.g., IA SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14, at 127 (4th ed.
1985); H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 630-31 (2d ed.
1965).
13 IA SUTHERLAND, supra note 42, § 21.14, at 127.
44 Fowler writes:
What may fairly be expected of us is to realize that among expressions of
several adjectives or nouns introduced by the some obviously cannot have the
repeated with each item without changing the sense (the black and white
penguins), and some can logically claim the repetition (the red and the yellow
tomatoes). A careful writer will have the distinction in mind, but he will not
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ticularly rigid in light of CERCLA's generally acknowledged
drafting deficiencies." s
Placing the language used in subsection 107(a)(1) in context
suggests that its adoption was the result of a drafting deficiency.
First, construing subsection 107(a)(1) as imposing liability on an
"innocent" owner is necessary to make section 107 internally
consistent. For example, subsections 107(c)(1) and 107(c)(2),
which provide the amount of chargeable response costs, both
refer to the liability of an "owner or operator. '46 These provi-
sions contemplate that an owner need not be an operator to be
liable for response costs.
Second, Congress used the subsection 107(a)(1) phrase "the
owner and operator" in other subsections that clearly contem-
plate the possibility of two different persons filling these roles.
Subsection 107(k)(2), for example, provides that if "the owner
or operator" of a facility notifies EPA that specified conditions
for transferring liability have been satisfied, such transfer will
be effective unless EPA otherwise notifies "the owner and op-
erator," in which case "the owner and operator" continue to be
liable.47
necessarily be a slave to logic; "the red and yellow tomatoes" may be preferred
for better reasons than ignorance or indolence. For other attempts to impose
a needless rigidity, see ONLY and NOT I.
H.W. FOWLER, supra note 42, 630-31 (emphasis in original).
4s Several courts and commentators have noted the Act's drafting deficiencies. See,
e.g., 632 F. Supp. at 578 (D. Md. 1986); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 & n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm.
& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 810 F. 2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) [hereinafter
NEPACCO]; Eckhardt, supra note 15, at 253. These drafting deficiencies are explained,
in part, by the Act's legislative history. CERCLA was a compromise package of other
bills that coalesced in last minute negotiations. Grad, supra note 15, at 1-2. See infra
note 54.
4 Subsection 9607(c)(l)-(2) provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the liability under
this section of an owner or operator or other responsible person for each
release of a hazardous substance or incident involving release of a hazardous
substance....
(2) Notwithstanding the limitations in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
liability of an owner or operator or other responsible person under this section
shall be the full and total costs of response and damages, if...
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). See also id.
§§ 9607(e)(l)-(2), (h), (k)(1).
'7 Subsection 9607(k)(2) provides:
Such transfer of liability shall be effective ninety days after the owner or
operator of such facility notifies the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency... that the conditions imposed by this subsection have been
satisfied. If within such ninety-day period the Administrator ... determines
that any such facility has not complied with all the conditions imposed by this
subsection or that insufficient information has been provided to demonstrate
1988]
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Finally, because no question exists that a waste site operator
is liable for CERCLA response costs, a grammarian would be
hard pressed to explain why Congress imposed liability on own-
ers and operators rather than on operators alone, unless it in-
tended to impose liability on an owner who was not also an
operator. In fact, interpreting subsection 107(a)(1) as imposing
liability only on an owner who also is an operator would cause
that provision to be mere surplusage, because subsection
107(a)(2) imposes liability on "any person who ... owned or
operated" a facility when any dumping occurred. 4 Thus, if a
court employs the rule of construction that statutory language
should be construed in a manner that does not render a clause
superfluous,49 the court should interpret subsection 107(a)(1) as
imposing liability on the current owner even if that person did
not operate the facility.
An examination of a statute's legislative history may help
resolve ambiguities in the text.50 Although the legislative history
for CERCLA as enacted is sparse,-1 the floor debates on the
Act indicate that Congress intended to impose liability on an
owner regardless of whether that person also is an operator. For
example, Congressman Broyhill (R-N.C.) stated: "[U]nder the
language of section 107 the owner or operator of a vessel or a
facility can be held strictly liable for various types of costs and
damages entirely on the basis of having been found to be an
owner or operator of any facility or vessel. '52 This conclusion
is firmly buttressed by the legislative history accompanying
such compliance, the Administrator... shall so notify the owner and operator
of such facility. . ., and the owner and operator of such facility shall continue
to be liable....
Id. § 9607(k)(2) (emphasis added).
I' d. § 9607(a)(2).
49 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 104 (4th ed. 1984). See
also United States v. Bear Marine Servs., 509 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. La. 1980) (construing
a provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
The court noted that (like CERCLA's legislative history) the Water Pollution Control
Act's legislative history was unclear and reflected the "'give and take' of the legislative
process, and the imprecision of group-undertaken drafting." Id. at 713. The court further
stated: "Unfortunately, there is a dearth of legislative history as to Subpart (2). And,
yet, as this Court has already observed, it 'has got to mean something.' It is the
obligation of this Court to give meaning to each and every portion of a legislative act."
Id. at 716.
50 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at 278.
51 See supra note 15.
52 126 CONG. REc. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill (R-N.C.)) (emphasis
added). See also supra notes 17-19.
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CERCLA's reauthorization53 and by the language of the bills
that coalesced to form CERCLA.54
5 See, e.g., Explanation of Purpose and Intent of the Judiciary Committee Report,
131 CONG. REC. HlI,083, H11,086 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985):
[The specified criteria] do not easily apply to a landowner who is liable as an
"1owner" of a "facility" under section 107(a), but who otherwise may be mini-
mally related to the hazardous substance problem at the facility. Therefore,
new subsection 122(g)(1)(B) provides that landowners may qualify for these
expedited settlements. The criteria for this type of de minimis settlement
require that the potentially responsible [sic] party: (1) own the real property
on or in which the facility is located; (2) not have conducted or allowed the
generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous
substance at the facility; and (3) not have contributed to the release or threat-
ened release through any act or omission.
See also 131 CONG. REC. H111,082 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Rodino
(D-N.J.)) ("[Tihe committee amendments encourage EPA to settle with-and not to
sue-.., individuals who became owners of land without any knowledge or respon-
sibility for the fact that it contained a hazardous waste site.").
m Three bills were the foundation of CERCLA: H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REc. 26,369-92 (1980); S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 17,989
(1979), and H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 26, 757 (1980). For a
legislative history of H.R. 85, see Grad, supra note 15, at 3-4. For a legislative history
of S. 1480, see id. at 6-14, 29-35; ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
DIVISION, SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVnL. RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUB. L. 96-510, vol. 1 at 462 (Comm. Print
1983) (October 1, 1980 draft); 126 CONG. REC. 30,916 (1980). For a legislative history
of H.R. 7020, see Grad, supra note 15, at 4-6, 14-18, 29-35; ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC
WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVTL. RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SuPERFUND), PUB.
L. 96-510, vol. 2 at 3 (Comm. Print 1983) (as introduced on April 2, 1980); id. at 138
(as reported); id. at 391 (as passed by the House). For merger of three bills to form
CERCLA, see 126 CONG. REc. 30,113 (1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford) ("This com-
promise [CERCLA] incorporates those parts of S. 1480, H.R. 7020 and H.R. 85 on
which there is broad consensus.").
Like CERCLA, H.R. 85 imposed liability for "response costs" on the owner and the
operator of a vessel or facility. The bill separately defined "owner" and "operator."
H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(x)-(y), 126 CONG. Rac. 26,369-392 (1980). The
definition of "operator" clearly indicates that the "owner" and "operator" will be dif-
ferent entities. H.R. 85 defines an "operator" as:
(1) [I]n the case of a vessel, a charterer by demise or any other person, except
the owner who is responsible for the operation, manning, victualing, and
supplying of the vessel, or
(2) in the case of a facility, any person, except the owner, responsible for the
operation of the facility by agreement with the owner...
Id. (emphasis added). A Committee Report accompanying H.R. 85 reiterates this dis-
tinction between an "owner" and an "operator": "In the case of a facility, an 'operator'
is defined to be a person who is carrying out operational functions for the owner of the
facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT
MARINE AND FISHERIES, H. R. REP. No. 172, PART 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6160,6182 [hereinafter
COMMITTEE REPORT ON H.R. 85, PART 1]. See also 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6174 ("Under the scheme developed in the bill, the owner
or operator of the vessel or facility ... is in the best position to prevent and control a
polluting discharge." (emphasis added)); 125 CONG. REc. 384-386 (1979) (statement of
Rep. Biaggi (D-N.Y.)) ("Mhe bill imposes... liability on the owner or operator...."
(emphasis added)). Furthermore, the Committee Report refers to owners forming "one
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Moreover, interpreting subsection 107(a)(1) to include lender/
owners not only is consistent with CERCLA's legislative history
but also promotes CERCLA's goals. In light of the enormous
costs of cleaning hazardous waste sites and of the remedial
actions necessary to stem the pollution that has seeped from
them, Congress necessarily spread liability widely. Before CER-
CLA, participants in the hazardous waste industry had avoided
internalizing all the costs associated with their operations. Waste
site owners and operators did not create leakproof sites because
of an ignorance of the effects of improperly disposed waste, a
virtual dearth of safe disposal technology, and, importantly, an
absence of effective legal sanctions. For similar reasons, waste
generators and transporters often did not safely package and
ship hazardous materials.
By imposing liability on every person who benefited from the
dumping activities, CERCLA forces each to internalize the costs
caused by unsafe disposal practices and to use safer disposal
methods to avoid future liability. Thus, section 107 imposes
liability not only on those persons who benefited directly from
of the three major classes (the others being operators and guarantors) subject to liability
under the Act." COMMITTEE REPORT ON H.R. 85, PART I, supra, at 6181. Cf. statement
by Representative Harsha (R-Ohio):
I would like to discuss two provisions for the purpose of establishing legislative
history. The first is the definition of "owner" contained in title I of H.R. 85.
During consideration of this measure by the Public Works Committee I offered
an amendment to clarify the definition, as reported by the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. This change was necessary because the orig-
inal definition inadvertently subjected those who hold title to a vessel or facility,
but do not participate in the management or operation and are not otherwise
affiliated with the person leasing or operating the vessel or facility, to the
liability provisions of the bill.
While the Merchant Marine Committee report indicated this situation was
not intended the statutory language is unclear. Therefore, I offered clarifying
language to truly exempt those who hold title but do not participate in the
operation or management activities. My amendment also requires that those
that hold title cannot be affilated [sic] in any way with those who lease or
charter the vessel or facility. This was done to prevent the establishment of
"dummy" corporations, with few assets, which would be the responsible party
for the purpose of the act.
126 CONG. REc. 26,210-12 (statement of Rep. Harsha) (1980). In contrast to H.R. 85,
S. 1480 simply incorporated by reference the Clean Water Act's definition of "owner
or operator," which is reproduced at supra note 10. That particular definition is virtually
identical to CERCLA's definition, though it does not include CERCLA's security
interest exception.
H.R. 7020 does not provide a definition of "owner" or of "operator." Instead, it
defined a "responsible party" for purposes of liability as including a person who "owned
or operated such site at the time during which it was utilized for the treatment, storage,
or disposal of any hazardous waste .... H.R. 7020, § 3041(b)(1), 96th Cong., 2d. Sess.,
126 CONG. REc. 26,757 (1980). The bill's use of the disjunctive denotes that different
persons may be the owner and the operator and that both classes of persons may be
liable under the terms of the bill.
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the hazardous dump-the waste generators, transporters, and
waste site operators-but also on those persons who benefited
indirectly by operation of the waste site, including a site owner
who does not directly operate it. 5 Courts have imposed section
107 liability on a lessor whose tenant operated a waste site
although the lessor did not participate in its operation.5 6 In one
section 107 case, the court even held a sublessor liable as an
"owner" for damages caused by its sublessee's operations even
though a sublessor does not own the land. 7 Although a landlord
does not benefit directly from its tenant's waste site operations,
it does benefit from rental payments generated by those opera-
tions. Holding a landlord liable also removes the economic in-
centive for a property owner to avoid CERCLA liability by
leasing the waste site to a subsidiary or other controlled entity.
The same theories apply to lenders that lend to hazardous
waste site owners. If the loan was made to finance the acquisi-
tion or operation of the site, the lender's situation is analogous
to the landlord's. Just as the landlord benefits from rental pay-
ments generated by the hazardous waste operations, so the
lender benefits from principal and interest payments generated
by operation of the site. Even if the loan was for a purpose
unrelated to operation of the site, the operation is aided because
the loan frees the operator's capital for use at the site. Further-
more, as with the landlord, holding a lender/owner liable for
response costs eliminates the economic incentive for a waste
55 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984).
m Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985); Sand Springs Home
v. Interplastic Corp., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2127 (N.D. Okla. 1987); United States
v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. Inst.) 20,616 (D.N.M. 1984); NEPACCO,
579 F. Supp. 823, 845 n.26 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). The landlord cases have involved § 107(a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982), rather than § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982). Sub-
section 107(a)(2) imposes liability on "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
Courts have been equally expansive in their interpretations of parties who are liable
as "operators." Despite customary legal deference to corporate form, courts have held
that corporate officers and shareholders can be personally liable for § 107 damages if
they were personally involved in the activities creating CERCLA liability. See, e.g.,
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); NEPACCO, 579
F. Supp. at 849; United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa.
1983). Similarly, one court has held that an institutional lender may be liable as an
"operator" because of its participation in management of a hazardous waste site. United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,997 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
57 United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003
(D.S.C. 1984).
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site operator to acquire title to the site in the name of a shell
corporation, to "lend" the shell corporation the necessary op-
erating capital, and then to acquire title to the site in settlement
of the loan after dumpinq activity at the site has terminated.
The lender's CERCLA liability is not triggered by an indirect
benefit alone, however. Like the landlord who owns the prop-
erty, the lender's liability is premised on its ownership of the
site. Under the statutory scheme, the lender will be liable only
if it enjoys the direct benefit of a cleanup that occurs while it
owns the site, if it acquired the site with notice of the waste, or
if it attempted to avoid liability by selling the property to an
innocent purchaser for a price that presumably represented the
fair market value of uncontaminated property.5 8 Although the
amount of response costs normally will not be fully reflected in
the increase in the land's fair market value, its value will un-
deniably be enhanced. Moreover, such liability is not absolute.
As described below, a lender/owner can avoid all liability for
response costs if it can establish the third-party defense of sub-
section 107(b)(3), 59 and a contribution action is available if it
cannot avoid liability. 60
Imposing CERCLA liability on lender/owners also furthers
CERCLA's goals by creating substantial incentives for lenders
to act as hazardous waste watchdogs. If a lender determines
that a parcel of land contains hazardous wastes, a knowledge-
able lender should refuse to accept the land as collateral unless
the potential borrower proves that the waste is properly con-
tained, even if the lender intends to sell the loan on the second-
ary mortgage market.61 The security otherwise is valueless. In
' Subsection 101(35)(C) provides that a former property owner is liable for response
costs if it knew of a release or threatened release before selling the property but
transferred ownership "without disclosing such knowledge.... ." 42 U.S.C.A,
§ 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987). See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 115-43 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 248-74 and accompanying text.
61 Like an originating lender, a secondary market buyer must be concerned with
potential CERCLA liability. Although secondary market mortgage purchasers are a step
removed from the loan transaction and may be unfamiliar with the secured land, they
are treated the same as any other lender/owner. Thus, under SARA's "contractual
relationship" definition, a secondary market mortgage purchaser that forecloses and
acquires title to the encumbered property will be unable to assert the third-party defense
if it had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous wastes on the site when it
foreclosed. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(c) (West Supp. 1987). See infra notes 115-35 and
accompanying text. During Congress' consideration of SARA, Federal Home Loan
Corporation, one of the largest buyers in the secondary market, proposed a definition
of "contractual relationship" that would protect a lender/owner if it was unaware of the
hazardous wastes on the encumbered land when the loan was made. See supra note 17.
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the absence of this proof, the lender will refuse to make the
loan, will charge a higher interest rate, or will require additional
collateral. If the loan is for operating expenses or for acquisition
of a waste site, the lender may condition the loan on the bor-
rower's agreement to dispose of hazardous wastes in a safe
manner. These results will have the beneficial effects of putting
some unsafe operators out of business or, by charging unsafe
owners higher interest rates, of forcing them to internalize some
of the costs generated by their operations.
The results of lender/owner liability have a darker side, how-
ever. For example, if a dump site owner or operator is unable
to borrow funds, it may have insufficient capital to clean the
site or to upgrade its operations by investing in new disposal
technologies. That result is diametrically opposed to CERCLA's
aims. Additionally, to satisfy the lender's inquiry concerning the
land, the site owner or operator will have an incentive to falsify
documents concerning the wastes it has accepted and its dis-
posal methods, a practice that will hinder future cleanup efforts.
Furthermore, waste site operators may refuse to accept espe-
cially toxic wastes or may charge higher prices for them, thereby
increasing the incidence of illicit, "midnight" dumping of the
worst forms of hazardous waste. Based on the current state of
knowledge concerning CERCLA's impact on lenders' decision-
making, however, these potential problems provide insufficient
reason to exempt lender/owners from CERCLA's liability pro-
visions. To determine whether imposing liability on lender/own-
ers will further CERCLA's goals in the long term would require
a detailed economic analysis, which is beyond the scope of this
Article.
By its terms, subsection 107(a)(1) imposes liability for re-
sponse costs on a property owner. Any argument that an owner
is liable only if it operated the leaking waste site is negated by
reference to the well-established rules of statutory construction,
the legislative history of CERCLA, and the economics of haz-
ardous waste site cleanups. Subsection 107(a)(1) affords no relief
to an owner merely because it acquired the property in connec-
tion with a loan relationship. As described below, however, the
Act's definition of an "owner or operator" protects lenders who
acquire title to land solely by reason of the loan relationship.
The effect of the potential liability of secondary mortgage market purchasers will be to
reduce the flow of capital from the secondary market to the loan originators.
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B. Subsection 101(20)(A): Security Interest Exception
The second argument lender/owners have used to attempt to
avoid CERCLA liability is based on the Act's definition of
"owner or operator." Subsection 101(20)(A) broadly defines the
terms "owner or operator" to include any person owning or
operating a vessel or facility.62 The definition expressly excludes
"a person, who, without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility. '63 A person who
satisfies the terms of this security interest exception is not liable
as an owner or operator pursuant to subsection 107(a)(1).r 4 Not
surprisingly, lender/owners sued for response costs have argued
that they acquired the contaminated property to protect their
security interests and, therefore, are not liable.65 This argument
is flawed in two fundamental ways.
First, the security interest exception applies only while a
person holds mere "indicia of ownership." When a lender ac-
quires the waste site, it owns a qualitatively different interest in
the land than mere indicia of ownership. Examination of the
purpose for the security interest exception and of the mortgage
law context in which it exists reveals that the exception is
directed to this qualitative difference between ownership of land
and of a mortgage. The purpose of the exception is to ensure
that mortgage holders are treated similarly under the Act despite
differing state law treatments of the interests created by a
mortgage.
In the majority of states, those denominated lien theory states,
state law characterizes a mortgage as conveying no title to the
landA6 Rather, the mortgage in these states creates only the right
to sell the encumbered land in case of default.6 7 A mortgage
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1987). The subsection is reproduced at
supra note 38.
63 Id. The Act does not similarly except from the definition of owner a trustee of a
land trust. In some states, property often is held in a land trust, with the trustee holding
legal title. Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 11, at 107 n.13a. Although CERCLA does
not expressly except the trustee from liability, a trustee has a strong argument that it
does not "own" the property. A trustee with active involvement in the property's
management, however, may be subject to liability.
4 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
65 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md.
1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
6Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 327 (1987).
67 Id. at 321-27.
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holder in these states would not be an owner under subsection
107(a)(1). 68 In a few other states, denominated title theory states,
however, state law characterizes a mortgage as actually con-
veying title to the encumbered land to the lender.69 Normally, a
lender in a title theory state will not take possession of the
property or otherwise hold itself out as being the owner of the
property, but the mortgage, by its terms or by operation of
common law, nevertheless invests the lender with indicia of
ownership. If CERCLA equated title with ownership, similarly
situated mortgage holders would be liable as owners in some
states but not in others. The security interest exception elimi-
nates this potential for unequal treatment. As long as a mortgage
holder has no greater interest in the encumbered land than the
mortgage, it will not be liable as an owner.
Although the distinction between title and indicia of owner-
ship is a technical one, examination of the language of subsec-
tion 101(20)(A) as a whole reveals that Congress intended to
draw this distinction. The first sentence of the "owner or oper-
ator" definition provides that an owner is a person "owning"
the affected property or who "owned" the property in the case
of abandoned property, whereas the security interest exception
provided in the next sentence of the definition applies to a
person who "holds indicia of ownership. '70 A reference to hold-
ing only indicia of ownership indicates that, although the holder
possesses an instrument indicating a conveyance of title to it,
such ownership is not ownership in the usual sense but is given
to serve another purpose-in this case, to secure a loan. The
logical conclusion is that the security interest exception applies
only to holders of security interests and not to persons who own
property.
The legislative histories of the three bills that formed the
foundation of CERCLA further support the conclusion that Con-
gress intended to distinguish between ownership for all purposes
and title as mere indicia of ownership. H.R. 85, the Compre-
hensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act,71 for ex-
ample, includes a definition of owner that is similar to that
contained in CERCLA but with an important difference. The
references in CERCLA to ownership and to holding indicia of
- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
69 Burkhart, supra note 66, at 328.
70 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
71 H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 26,369-92 (1980).
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ownership are contained in separate sentences, thereby creating
a possible inference that Congress' reference to indicia of own-
ership in the second sentence was a drafting error. The definition
in H.R. 85, however, demonstrates that Congress was cognizant
of the difference between the terms. "Owner" is defined in H.R.
85 as:
[A]ny person holding title to, or, in the absence of title, any
other indicia of ownership of, a vessel or facility, but does
not include a person who, without participating in the man-
agement or operation of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility.72
The Committee Reports concerning H.R. 85 echo this distinc-
tion between title and indicia of ownership in their discussions
of the "owner" definition. 73 Similarly, the two other bills that
eventually joined to form CERCLA each contained a definition
of owner that reflects the distinction between ownership and
possession of mere indicia of ownership. 74 The distinction un-
dercuts the lender/owner's first argument that it is protected
from CERCLA liability based on the security interest exception.
Once the lender/owner acquires the property at a foreclosure
sale or by voluntary settlement, it no longer holds mere indicia
of ownership; instead, it owns the property and is liable as an
owner.
Notwithstanding the legislative history of the "owner or op-
erator" definition, the phrase "primarily to protect his security
interest" provides lender/owners sufficient room for a second
argument against CERCLA liability based on subsection
101(20)(A). 75 They may argue that the statutory exception is
broad enough to include a lender that acquires the land to ensure
repayment of the loan. When a lender forecloses its security
interest and purchases the property at the foreclosure sale or
when it otherwise acquires title in satisfaction of the secured
debt, it usually does so "primarily to protect" its interest in the
property.76 Because most lenders are not in the business of
72 Id. (emphasis added).
71 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS & TRANSPORTATION, H.R. REP. No. 172,
PART 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6212, 6213; COMMITTEE REPORT ON H.R. 85, PART 1, supra note 54, at 6181.
74 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rac. 26,757-99 (1980); S. 1480, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 126 CONG. Rc. 30,898-987 (1980).
7 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
76 Burkhart, supra note 66, at 331-32.
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acquiring land and managing it for its investment potential, lend-
ers normally resort to foreclosure or accept encumbered land in
settlement of the debt only when the debtor is unable to repay
the loan or when state law prohibits a lender from pursuing
personal liability until it has attempted to satisfy the debt from
the collateral securing it. Particularly when the defaulting debtor
has abandoned the property or is mismanaging it, a lender may
conclude that unless it intervenes to put the property ownership
in new hands, the value of the lender's security interest and the
lender's chances of repayment in full from a sale of the land
will also deteriorate.
While the argument may be consistent with a lay person's
first reading of the statute, it is contradicted by the statute's
wording and legislative history,77 which demonstrate that Con-
gress did not use the phrase "primarily to protect his security
interest" to refer to the lender's reasons for acquiring title to
the encumbered land. Instead, the phrase refers to the lender's
reasons for accepting a mortgage in those jurisdictions that treat
a mortgage as conveying indicia of ownership to the encumbered
land. The placement of the phrase in the statute strongly sup-
ports this conclusion: "'[O]wner or operator'. . . does not in-
clude a person, who ... holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest .... "78 As discussed above, the
term "indicia of ownership" refers in this context to a mortgage
interest in the title theory states. As can be seen, the "primarily"
phrase specifies when a mortgage holder will be free of liability
as an owner. As an exception to a statutory imposition of lia-
bility, the security interest exception must be strictly con-
strued.79 Therefore, once a lender holds more than mere indicia
of ownership, as it does when it buys the property, it no longer
qualifies for the exception.
The legislative history of subsection 101(20)(A) further dem-
onstrates that the particular placement of the "primarily" clause
was not the result of imprecise drafting; a Committee Report
concerning H.R. 85, which included a definition of owner similar
to CERCLA's, states that the term "owner" does not include
"certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as a
financial institution) who, without participating in the manage-
'n See supra note 54 (sources of CERCLA).
71 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
79 See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, § 47.11, at 144.
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ment or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order
to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrange-
ment under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regula-
tions."80 Furthermore, in describing the security interest excep-
tion, the Report states: "[A] financial institution which held title
primarily to secure a loan but also received tax benefits as the
result of holding title would not be an 'owner' as long as it did
not participate in the management or operation of the vessel or
facility.""' Therefore, the measure of the security interest ex-
ception is the lender's purpose for taking indicia of ownership
as security for the loan, rather than the lender's reasons for
subsequently acquiring the land.
Finally, the lender/owner's argument that it acquired the en-
cumbered property primarily to protect its security interest is
inconsistent with the general concepts traditionally and cur-
rently employed in real estate finance law. When a mortgagee
acquires the encumbered property, it does not do so to protect
its security interest. That interest is protected by recording it in
the public property records in accordance with the terms of the
state's recording act. Instead, the lender acquires the property
to recover the outstanding loan amount. If the lender acquired
the property by a voluntary conveyance, usually by a deed in
lieu of foreclosure, the lender has agreed to accept the land in
full or partial satisfaction of the debt. The lender's ownership
of the land has no preservative effect on the security interest.
On the contrary, by acquiring the property title, the lender risks
losing its security interest through operation of the doctrine of
merger. 82
The lender/owner's argument is attenuated even further if the
lender acquired the property by foreclosing on a mortgage and
buying at the sale, rather than by voluntary conveyance. Be-
cause a foreclosure sale extinguishes the lender's security in-
terest, a lender/owner simply will not possess a security interest
at the time of the cleanup. The security interest exception,
however, is worded in the present tense: "Such term ['owner or
operator'] does not include a person, who ... holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest... ." Thus,
to qualify for the security interest exception, that interest must
go COMMITTEE REPORT ON H.R. 85, PART 1, supra note 54, at 6181.
81 Id.
12 Burkhart, supra note 66, at 331-52.
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exist when the cleanup occurs.8 3 When the lender has fore-
closed, the security interest is extinguished and so is the pro-
tection of the exception. In sum, the lender's acquisition of the
property protects the lender's source of payment, not its secu-
rity interest.
Although the above arguments may appear to be unduly tech-
nical in light of CERCLA's drafting deficiencies, SARA's
amendments corroborate the limits of the exception. SARA
amended the definition of "owner or operator" to provide that
if the facility is acquired by a unit of state or local government
due to a "bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or similar means," the term "owner or operator" means
the person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled the
facility immediately before the foreclosure. 84 Congress did not
provide a similar exception for lender/owners, although the busi-
ness journals had highlighted this issue before SARA's
enactment.8 5
Final confirmation that a lender/owner is not included within
the security interest exception is supplied by use of the term
"owner or operator" throughout the Act in contexts that would
cause such a limitation of liability to violate CERCLA's statu-
tory goals. A determination that a lender/owner is protected
from section 10786 liability because of the security interest ex-
ception would also except the lender/owner from all other CER-
CLA provisions that otherwise apply to an owner or operator
and that should apply to a lender/owner. For example, subsec-
tion 104(e) provides that a government agent who takes samples
of hazardous substances from a property must "give to the
owner, operator, or person in charge a receipt describing the
sample obtained and if requested a portion of each such sample
equal in volume of weight to the portion retained." 87 Certainly,
a lender/owner, no less than any other variety of owner, should
have the advantage of this statutory right to a receipt and to a
portion of any sample taken. Similarly, subsection 111(g) re-
quires an owner or operator to provide notice to potential in-
jured parties of a hazardous substance that has been released
83 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1987).
91 See, e.g., Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 11, at 111-12; Burcat, supra note 13, at
513-15.
's 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
87 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(1)(B) (1982).
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from the vessel or facility.88 Imposition of this responsibility on
a lender/owner is necessary because, as the person in possession
of the vessel or facility, the lender/owner is in the best position
to discover such discharges, to analyze them, and to notify
potentially affected parties. If a lender/owner were excepted
from this requirement by virtue of the security interest excep-
tion, the notice requirement of subsection 111(g) would be nul-
lified because it does not impose this duty on any other person.
For public safety reasons, the lender/owner must be subject to
this statutory responsibility. The lender/owner, therefore, must
be excluded from the security interest exception to preserve the
Act's balance.
The security interest exception was the primary focus of both
reported decisions involving a response cost recovery action
against a lender/owner.89 Predictably, the lender/owner in each
case argued that it was not liable because of the security interest
exception. One federal district court agreed with the defendant's
argument, 90 and the other federal district court indicated that on
a different set of facts it also would hold that the security interest
exception insulates a lender/owner from liability.91
In the first of these cases decided, United States v. Mirabile,
American Bank and Trust Company (ABT) had financed a paint
manufacturing business. The loan was secured, in part, by a
mortgage on the manufacturing site. When the loan went into
default, ABT foreclosed and was the highest bidder at the sher-
iff's sale. Rather than accept a sheriff's deed to the property,
however, ABT searched for a purchaser for its interest and, four
months after the sale, assigned its interest in the site to the
Mirabiles. 92
-; Id. § 9611(g).
89 An earlier case, In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985) has
been described as stating in dictum that a lender is not an owner subject to CERCLA
liability if it acquires the property in which it has a security interest. See, e.g., Fear of
Foreclosure: United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) No. 7, at 10,165, 10,165 n.5 (July 1986). In re T.P. Long, however, does not
support that proposition. Instead, the court stated in dictum that if the holder of a
security interest in personal property repossessed the property for sale pursuant to its
security agreement without acquiring title, the security interest holder would not be an
owner as defined by CERCLA. This dictum is a correct interpretation of CERCLA. If
the lender does not acquire title to the contaminated property, whether real or personal,
it is not an owner.
90 United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
91 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
9Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
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Approximately fourteen months after the Mirabiles acquired
the property, an EPA agent inspected it and discovered some
550 drums of waste from the paint manufacturing operation,
many of which were in a deteriorated condition. When the
Mirabiles failed to respond to an EPA cleanup notice, EPA
cleaned the site. EPA then sued the Mirabiles to recover its
response costs, and the Mirabiles joined ABT and others as
third-party defendants. ABT moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that: (1) it was never an owner because it acquired
only equitable title to the property at the foreclosure sale and
never acquired legal title by accepting a sheriff's deed; and (2) it
foreclosed and took steps to secure the property after the fo-
reclosure sale solely to protect its security interest. 93
ABT's argument that it was never an owner of the property
within the meaning of section 10794 was weak. ABT conceded
that it had acquired equitable title to the property, pursuant to
which it took possession of the property. Moreover, no other
person could properly be denominated the owner of the prop-
erty. Under the relevant state foreclosure law, neither the former
owner nor any junior lienor retained a right to redeem the prop-
erty title after the sale.95 Furthermore, state law required the
sheriff who conducted the foreclosure sale to perfect title in the
foreclosure sale purchaser by issuing a deed within ten days
after the sale. 96 ABT successfully delayed issuance of the deed
by advising the sheriff and the local tax department that "it
intended to take title to the property. ' 97 Considering ABT's
knowledge of the waste on the property and of the cost of
disposing of it,98 ABT may have been attempting to avoid CER-
CLA liability by avoiding legal title to the property.
Although the court recognized that the property title ABT
acquired at the foreclosure sale could be sufficient to bring it
within the scope of CERCLA's liability provisions, the court
determined that the original security interest controlled regard-
less of the subsequent acquisition of title:
Id.
9442 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
95 See In re Rouse, 48 Bankr. 236, 239 (E.D. Pa. 1985) C'.... [Aiecording to Penn-
sylvania law, the debtor's right to redeem the mortgage terminated when the sheriff's
sale took place."); G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.4, at
616 n.1 (2d ed. 1985).
9 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3135 (Purdon 1987). The only statutory exception is if
a "petition has been filed to set aside the sale."
97 Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
9 Id.
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I need not resolve the issue of whether, under Pennsylvania
law, ABT's successful bid at the sheriff's sale technically
vested ABT with ownership as defined by the statute. Re-
gardless of the nature of the title received by ABT, its actions
with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in
an effort to protect its security interest in the property. ABT
made no effort to continue [the paint manufacturing] oper-
ations on the property, and indeed foreclosed some eight
months after all operations had ceased.
... [I]n enacting CERCLA Congress manifested its intent
to impose liability upon those who were responsible for and
profited from improper disposal practices. Thus, it would
appear that before a secured creditor such as ABT may be
held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-
day operational aspects of the site. In the instant case, ABT
merely foreclosed on the property after all operations had
ceased and thereafter took prudent and routine steps to se-
cure the property against further depreciation."
In effect, the court's reasoning eliminates the statutory im-
position of liability on the person who owns the property when
the cleanup occurs. The court's reasoning is flawed in three
ways. First, under the statutory scheme, the current owner is
liable not because it is "responsible for and profited from im-
proper disposal practices," but because it benefits from the
cleanup through the increase in the property's value. °0 Second,
nothing in the legislative history justifies a conclusion that Con-
gress intended to treat lender/owners differently than other in-
nocent purchasers. In fact, a lender such as ABT that provided
financing for the waste generating activity is a less sympathetic
defendant than a purchaser who did not contribute in any way
to the operation and, indeed, may have acquired the land with-
out knowledge of the hazardous wastes on the property. Finally,
as developed below, 101 a landowner has a common law respon-
sibility to correct hazardous conditions on its property regard-
less of whether it caused or contributed to the hazard. The
security interest exception to liability properly does not protect
lender/owners.
Ironically, the court in Mirabile had an obvious and incon-
trovertible ground for granting ABT's motion for summary judg-
ment: ABT did not own the site during the EPA cleanup. ABT
99 Id.
100 See supra note 26.
10 See infra notes 190-237 and accompanying text.
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assigned its property interest to the Mirabiles on December 15,
1981, and an EPA Official first visited the property in February
1983.102 No c6urt or commentator has previously identified this
particular flaw in the court's reasoning. In fact, United States
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company03 indicates that the seed
planted by the Mirabile court may mature into a noxious weed.
In Maryland Bank & Trust, Maryland Bank & Trust (MB&T)
lent money to the owner and operator of a trash ahd garbage
dump site. The borrower ran the business on property owned
jointly with his spouse. According to the district court's factual
summary, MB&T knew the nature of the borrower's business;
but the record does not reveal whether MB&T obtained this
information before or after making the loan. 104 When the owners
sold the property to their son, MB&T made him a $335,000
purchase money loan. The son defaulted on the loan, and MB&T
foreclosed on the property and purchased it at the sale. Eleven
months later, the son reported the existence of hazardous wastes
on the site to the county health department, which then notified
EPA. Some seventeen months after MB&T had acquired the
property for $381,500, EPA cleaned it at a cost of approximately
$551,713.50 and demanded payment from MB&T. When MB&T
failed to pay, EPA brought suit.05
Among other defenses, MB&T argued that it was not liable
pursuant to the security interest exception. The court rejected
this defense for three reasons. First, the court recognized that
the foreclosure sale extinguished MB&T's security interest and
that, therefore, MB&T did not possess "indicia of ownership
primarily to protect [its] security interest" when the EPA
cleanup occurred. 106 Second, the court cited legislative history
to demonstrate that Congress created the security interest ex-
ception for the limited purpose of insuring that similarly situated
lenders are treated equally regardless of differing state law rules
"1 Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,993. Although EPA did not
inspect the property until 1983, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources informed Mr. Mirabile "in the winter of 1981-1982" that drums on the property
contained hazardous waste and requested that he remove them. Nothing in the opinion
indicates, however, that EPA or the state agency ever contacted ABT about the prop-
erty, either before or after ABT assigned its interest in the land to the Mirabiles.
,0 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
104 Id. at 575.
1o Id. at 575-76.
'0 Id. at 579.
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of mortgage and title. 0 7 Finally, the court recognized that
MB&T would be unjustly enriched if it were not held liable for
EPA's response costs:
Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal
government alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up
the site, while the former mortgagee-turned-owner, would
benefit from the clean-up by the increased value of the now
unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the mortgagee could
acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective purchas-
ers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and
would shy away from the sale. Yet once the property has
been cleared at the taxpayers' expense and becomes mar-
ketable, the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a position
to sell the site at a profit.
In essence, [MB&T's] position would convert CERCLA
into an insurance scheme for financial institutions, protecting
them against possible losses due to the security of loans with
polluted properties. 08
Unfortunately, the court did not stop its analysis there but con-
tinued by discussing Mirabile. Despite the Maryland Bank &
Trust court's strong statements of the policy reasons for holding
lender/owners liable under CERCLA, the court indicated that
it would not hold a lender/owner liable if it had owned the
contaminated property for only a few months before the
cleanup. Like the Mirabile court, the Maryland Bank & Trust
court failed to recognize that the lender in Mirabile was not
liable for response costs simply because it was not the owner
during the cleanup. Instead, the court characterized the Mirabile
holding as turning on the lender/owner's sale of the property
four months after the foreclosure sale:
The [Mirabile] court found that the mortgagee's purchase of
the land at the foreclosure was plainly undertaken in an effort
to protect its security interest in the property. That holding
pertained to a situation in which the mortgagee-turned-owner
promptly assigned the property. To the extent to which that
opinion suggests a rule of broader application, this Court
respectfully disagrees.1' 9
This statement implies that the Maryland Bank & Trust court
agreed with the Mirabile holding on its facts. The conclusion is
7 Id. at 580.
108 Id.
109 Id. (emphasis added).
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reinforced by the court's further statement: "The [security in-
terest] exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently
holding title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale,
at least when, as here, the former mortgagee has held title for
nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA cleanup."110
Again, this statement implies that the court might hold that the
security interest exception protects a lender if it purchased the
property less than a year before the EPA cleanup.
The Maryland Bank & Trust court, however, expressly re-
served the issue of whether a lender can qualify for the security
interest exception after acquisition of contaminated property.111
Its discussion in dictum of the CERCLA liability of a lender/
owner that owns for less than a year, however, is troubling.
Although the court clearly recognized the reasons for denying
lender/owners the protection of the security interest exception,
it indicated that it would follow the Mirabile court's lead when
deciding a case in which the lender/owner held title for several
months. Such a decision would interfere with CERCLA's leg-
islative scheme by creating a class of landowners who could
avoid liability for response costs and other obligations CERCLA
imposes on landowners for the public safety.
Regardless of how long a lender/owner owns land before a
hazardous waste cleanup, the lender does not qualify for the
security interest exception in subsection 101(20)(A).112 Once the
lender acquires the land, it no longer holds mere indicia of
ownership. Furthermore, a lender's argument that it acquired
the property primarily to protect its security interest is unavail-
ing. That statutory phrase refers not to the lender's acquisition
of the land but to its reasons for accepting a mortgage. Thus,
the security interest exception serves the very limited purpose
of ensuring that CERCLA treats secured lenders equally despite
differences in state law mortgage characterizations.11 3 Although
the security interest exception provides no relief to a lender/
owner, the third-party defense of subsection 107(b)(3) 114 offers
a safe harbor, albeit a narrow one.
110 Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
"I Id. at 579 n.5.
112 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1982).
"I See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
114 2 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
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C. Subsection 107(b)(3): Third-Party Defense
Although a lender/owner is potentially liable for response
costs as an owner under subsection 107(a)(1), it still may avoid
liability even if the cleanup occurs during its ownership. Con-
gress provided three affirmative defenses to liability. Subsection
107(b)(1)-(3) provides that an otherwise responsible party will
avoid liability if it can prove that the hazardous waste release
or threat of release and the resulting damages were caused solely
by (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, or (3) an act or omission
of a third party." 5 Not surprisingly, litigation concerning the
subsection 107(b) defenses has centered on the third-party
defense.
Originally, to establish the third-party defense, an owner had
to prove only three facts. First, the owner had to establish that
the third party's actions were the sole cause of the hazardous
condition." 6 The CERCLA legislative scheme requires that any-
one that contributed to a hazardous waste problem share in the
cost of correcting it. Second, the owner had to establish that it
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances on
its land." 7 Apparently, Congress did not intend to relieve an
owner qualifying for the third-party defense of any duty to
exercise due care with respect to the hazardous waste.I" Third,
the owner had to establish that the third party was not the
"5 Subsection 9607(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff
and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. 111984).
1
6 Id.
117 Id.
"S INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMMITTEE, H.R. REP. 1016, PART 1, 96th
Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 6119, 6137.
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owner's employee, agent, or "one whose act or omission occurs
in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly
or indirectly, with the [owner] (except where the sole contrac-
tual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance
for carriage by a common carrier by rail). .. ."119 By providing,
in effect, an exception to the exception, Congress prevented an
owner from escaping CERCLA liability by the simple expedient
of contracting with a third party.
Before SARA, CERCLA did not include a definition of the
type of contractual relationship that would defeat the third-party
defense. According to authorities on statutory construction, the
proper construction of the term in this context is that an owner
cannot avoid liability if the third party was an independent
contractor, just as the owner cannot avoid liability if the third
party was the owner's agent or employee. 20 This interpretation
of the contractual relationship provision is supported by the
parenthetical provision following it concerning common carrier
contracts. The term "contractual relationship" also properly ap-
plies to lease agreements. A landlord cannot avoid liability for
its tenant's dumping activities based on the third-party de-
fense.121 Interpreting the term "contractual relationship" to ap-
ply to agreements with independent contractors or with tenants
is consistent with the common-law concept of a landowner's
nondelegable duties.122
Although CERCLA originally did not include a definition of
contractual relationship for the third-party defense, SARA pro-
vides a definition of that term in a lengthy new definitional
subsection 101(35).123 Consistent with Congress' determination
to spread response costs over the widest possible base and to
encourage property owners to clean their waste sites, SARA's
contractual relationship definition restricts the availability of the
119 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
110 See, e.g., 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, § 47.17, at 166 (defining ejusdem
generis: "Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those enum-
erated by the specific words.").
121 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985) (lessor of
a warehouse where lessee is releasing hazardous waste is a potentially liable party under
CERCLA); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616,
20,616 (D.N.M. 1984) (defendant may not assert the third-party affirmative defense in
connection with activities done by tenants of its property).
'2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1979); W.L. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON,
TORTS § 71, at 511-15 (5th ed. 1984).
,2 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (West Supp. 1987).
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third-party defense to the most innocent owners and creates
new incentives for private cleanups. Before amendment, CER-
CLA did not impose liability on an innocent owner who acquired
the contaminated property after dumping stopped and who sold
the property before the cleanup. New subsection 101(35) vir-
tually has eliminated that safe harbor for an innocent lender/
owner by providing circumstances under which a former prop-
erty owner is liable for response costs if it had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the hazardous condition-even if it did
not contribute to the contamination by action or by inaction.
Subsection 101(35)(A) defines a contractual relationship to
include "land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring
title or possession." 12 4 The third-party defense therefore now
applies only if the release or threatened release and resulting
damage are caused solely by "an act or omission of a third party
other than ... one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with [land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring
title or possession or-other types of contractual relationships],
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant."'1 Although
awkwardly connected to the language of the third-party defense,
subsection 101(35)(A) confirms the judicial holdings that a waste
site owner cannot avoid liability by leasing the property or
otherwise transferring possession to a third party.126
Subsection 101(35)(A) takes a significant step beyond this
accepted principle, however, by providing that a transfer of title,
rather than of the mere right to possess, can defeat the third-
party defense. 2 7 Again, the reference in subsection 101(35)(A)
to a deed is awkwardly connected. Rarely, if ever, will a third
party's dumping activities "occur ... in connection with" a
deed or other instrument transferring title. Subsections
101(35)(A)(i), 101(35)(B), and 101(35)(C), however, illustrate the
meaning of this reference to title conveyances by imposing two
significant new conditions to the third-party defense.
New subsections 101(35)(A)(i) and 101(35)(B) limit the third-
party defense by imposing substantial requirements on a defen-
dant when it acquires the property. l2 These subsections provide
that a defendant qualifies for the third-party defense only if it
I24 Id. § 9601 (35)(A).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
126 See supra cases cited in notes 56-57.
127 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
I's Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i), (B).
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can establish that, before it acquired the property, it conducted
"all appropriate inquiry"'129 and "did not know and had no reason
to know"'30 of the existence on the site of the leaking hazardous
substances. Ironically, responsible business practices will usu-
ally preclude a lender/owner from proving that it satisfied these
requirements, especially in light of the factors that a court is
statutorily directed to consider in determining whether a defen-
dant is eligible for the protection of the third-party defense. 31
Commercial lenders virtually always require a title examina-
tion for any property offered as collateral. Although title ex-
amination reports normally are limited to a statement of the
current state of title, the title examiner preparing the report
generally examines the prior links in the chain of title. There-
fore, information about prior owners and users would be avail-
able to the lender, enabling it to assess the likelihood that the
property had been used in the past as a waste site or for a
hazardous waste generating business, such as paint production.
Furthermore, lenders extending loans to commercial borrowers
often investigate the borrower's business operations in order to
tailor the loan agreement to the borrower's particular need.
Thus, the lender would have notice of the nature of the borrow-
er's business, including the potential for storing or disposing
hazardous waste on the property. Lenders also commonly em-
ploy inspectors to examine the property, particularly in connec-
tion with construction loans. The inspector should discover any
visible signs of hazardous waste on the property. Finally, lenders
often require a borrower to execute an affidavit at the loan
closing certifying facts concerning the condition of the property
and its title. Thus, of all potential property purchasers, a lender
is among the most able to discover the potential for hazardous
waste contamination. 32
The third-party defense, however, will not necessarily protect
a lender/owner even if it did not discover the existence of haz-
ardous wastes in the course of normal pre-loan investigations.
'29 Id. § 9601(35)(B).
130 Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
"3 Subsection 101(35)(B) directs the court to consider: (1) the defendant's specialized
knowledge or experience; (2) the relationship of the purchase price the defendant paid
to the value of the property if uncontaminated; (3) any commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the property; (4) the obviousness of the presence or
likely presence of contamination at the property; and (5) the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
,12 See generally M.R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROP-
ERTY (4th ed. 1984).
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Despite lenders' arguments tO, the contrary, EPA has taken the
position that a lender/owner will not satisfy the inquiry duty of
subsection 10t(35)(B) merely by investigating the property be-
fore making the loan. The lender/owner will qualify for the third-
party defense only if it did not have actual or constructive notice
when it acquired the property. 133 This position is firmly grounded
in the statutory language. 134
More oyer, subsection 101(35)(B) provides that a court deter-
mining whether a defendant qualifies for the third-party defense
must consider whether the contamination could have beep dis-
covered by "appropriate inspection." This standard apparently
requires an investigation, that is more focused on determining
the existence of hazardous waste on the site than a lender's
normal loan investigation. The most "appropriate inspection"
t(or determining the existence of hazardous waste contamination
is by specifically testing the property for such contamination.
Predictably, as a direct result of CERCLA and now of SARA,
the number of private environmental inspectors is rapidly in-
creasing. Additionally, lenders' attorneys are advising their
clients to include such inspections as part of their routine loan
processing and pre-foreclosure procedures. 135
The lender's usual method of acquiring the property, foreclo-
sure, enhances the risk that it will not qualify for the third-party
defense. Subsection 101(35)(C) directs a court ruling on the
availability of the third-party defense to examine the purchase
price paid in relation to the property's value if uncontaminated.
If the purchaser paid significantly less than the uncontaminated
property value, the apparent presumption is that it had actual
knowledge of the contamination or should have been alerted to
the fact that something was amiss. Foreclosing lenders may run
afoul of this provision because foreclosure sale prices often are
substantially lower than the property's fair market value. Al-
though that fact reduces the probative value of the price paid
as an indicator of the purchasing lender's actual or constructive
133 Leifer Paper, supra note 26, at 4.
I3 Subsection 101(35)(B) provides:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in [sub-
section I01(35)(A)(i)], the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of
acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort
to minimize liability.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
131 See, e.g., Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 11, at 101; Richman & Stukane, supra
note 13, at 13; Shea, supra note 13, at 11.
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knowledge of the property contamination, a court may not be
inclined to rule in favor of the lender on this basis because of
Congress' express intent to assess response costs against those
economically benefited by the cleanup.
Perhaps the most serious obstacle for a lender/owner to sur-
mount, however, in its attempt to claim the protection of the
third-party defense is the subsection 101(35)(B) provision that
the court, in determining whether the lender had reason to know
of the contamination, consider whether the defendant has "any
specialized knowledge or experience. ' 136 The court's analysis in
Maryland Bank and Trust137 does not bode well for lender/
owners in this regard, as the court strongly indicated that it
would hold a lender/owner to a high standard in determining
whether the lender/owner had sufficient reason to know of the
contamination to prevent it from asserting the third-party de-
fense. In discussing the policy reasons for imposing liability on
lender/owners, the court stated: "Mortgagees ... have the
means to protect themselves, by making prudent loans. Finan-
cial institutions are in a position to investigate and discover
potential problems in their secured properties. For many lending
institutions, such research is routine. CERCLA will not absolve
them from responsibility for their mistakes of judgment.' 38 As
might be expected, EPA has echoed this view. An EPA official
has indicated that EPA will hold commercial lenders to a higher
standard of knowledge than many other types of property own-
ers.1 39 Therefore, for a lender to retain the protection of the
third-party defense, it must document first that before acquiring
the property it performed a thorough search of the property title
and of the land's physical condition and second that its inves-
tigation did not reveal any evidence of hazardous waste on the
site.
Even if the lender/owner can establish that it was an innocent
purchaser of the property under SARA, it will qualify for the
third-party defense only if it can prove that it also was an
innocent seller under new subsection 101(35)(C).140 That sub-
136 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
137 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
138 Id. at 580 (footnotes omitted).
119 Leifer Paper, supra note 26, at 5-6.
140 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987). Of course, this statutory requirement
does not apply if the lender has not sold the land. Regardless of whether the lender has
sold the land, the lender will lose the third-party defense if it "caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the
action. ... Id. § 9601(35)(D).
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section provides the second way in which SARA's contractual
relationship definitional section restricts availability of the third-
party defense. Subsection 101(35)(C) provides that a former
property owner is liable for response costs, even if it did not
contribute to the contamination by action or inaction, if it ob-
tained actual knowledge of the hazardous waste contamination
during ownership but did not inform the property buyer of that
fact. This new provision creates an incentive that did not pre-
viously exist for an innocent property purchaser who discovers
hazardous waste contamination to clean the property, rather
than to attempt to avoid CERCLA liability by selling the prop-
erty before an EPA cleanup.
Under new subsection 101(35)(C), when an owner discovers
the hazardous condition, it has three options. It can (1) clean
the site, (2) sell the property and disclose the condition, or
(3) sell the property without disclosing the condition. If it sells
and discloses, subsection 101(35)(A)(i) would prevent the pur-
chaser from using the third-party defense even if a cleanup does
not occur during its ownership. Few, if any, purchasers would
be willing to buy under these circumstances. On the other hand,
if the owner sells without disclosing the existence of the haz-
ardous waste, it is liable for response costs under new subsec-
tion 101(35)(C) 141 whenever the cleanup occurs. Therefore, aside
from fraudulent concealment, the only way to make the property
marketable again and to avoid CERCLA liability is to clean the
site. EPA and the public obviously benefit from this result be-
cause the property will be cleaned sooner than if EPA performed
the cleanup, and the cleanup will not require Superfund financ-
ing or a response cost recovery action. From the lender's per-
spective, this new subsection 101(35)(C) creates an additional
incentive for scrupulous examination of a parcel of land before
accepting it as collateral for a loan and before acquiring title to
it.
The third-party defense provides a lender/owner's only real-
istic escape hatch from CERCLA liability under a proper inter-
pretation of the Act. Before SARA, a lender/owner who did not
operate the site and exercised due care with respect to existing
hazardous wastes on the property would not be liable for re-
sponse costs even if the cleanup occurred during its owner-
4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987).
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ship. 142 SARA has virtually eliminated this safe harbor for lend-
ers, however, and further creates a circumstance under which
a lender will be liable for response costs although the cleanup
occurred after it sold the contaminated property. Under the
current state of the law, even the most innocent lender/owners
will have an uphill battle qualifying for the third-party defense
because of their recognized expertise in evaluating property.143
As a last resort, therefore, a lender might argue that this liability
scheme is unconstitutional.
D. Constitutionality
Defendants in CERCLA response cost recovery actions have
challenged the Act on several constitutional grounds, including
arguments based on an alleged violation of substantive due pro-
cess, 44 the taking clause, 145 and the contract clause.146 To date,
no court has ruled on the constitutionality of CERCLA as ap-
plied to a lender. Accordingly, this section of the Article will
focus on the constitutional defenses that a lender might assert
in a CERCLA action. CERCLA affects a lender's rights and
liabilities both when it owns only the mortgage and if and when
it subsequently acquires the encumbered land. Therefore, anal-
ysis of CERCLA's constitutionality as it affects lenders must
focus both on a lender's mortgage ownership and on its land
142 See Cadillac Fairview/Califomia Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,376, 20,378 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
143 One commentator has argued that Congress enacted the contractual relationship
definition as part of SARA "to make clear that innocent purchasers of land may rely on
the 'third-party' defense despite the fact that they engaged in a land transaction with
the previous owner who caused a release." Garber, Federal Common Law of Contri-
bution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 378 (1987). As
discussed above, the new "contractual relationship" definition has a very different effect.
144 See, e.g., NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 218-21 (D. Mo. 1985).
14- See, e.g., NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 734; Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 215-
17.
146 See, e.g., Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 214; United States v. Stringfellow,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,388, 20,389 (C.D. Cal 1984). At least one CERCLA
defendant also has challenged CERCLA as violating the ex post facto clause and the
equal protection clause. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 214. The court
rejected both challenges. The ex post facto clause, applies only to criminal laws that
inflict punishment. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
17 n. 13 (1977). The equal protection challenge also cannot be sustained under the rational
relationship test. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 14.3, at 530 (3d ed. 1986).
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ownership. Such analysis reveals that the Act is constitutional
as applied to lenders in both situations.
1. Substantive Due Process Challenges
An innocent lender/owner plausibly can defend a CERCLA
recovery action on two substantive due process grounds. First,
the lender/owner may argue that imposition of CERCLA liability
on a person who did not create or contribute to the problem for
which damages are assessed violates substantive due process.
Second, it may assert that CERCLA constitutes unconstitution-
ally retroactive legislation. Although retroactive legislation is
not expressly prohibited by a constitutional provision, the Su-
preme Court has held that retroactive legislation may violate
substantive due process. 147 In light of the low level of scrutiny
afforded economic and social welfare legislation, 48 both argu-
ments should be dismissed.
The first argument, that CERCLA's liability scheme is un-
constitutional as applied to innocent owners, merits only passing
reference. Few would deny that leaking hazardous waste sites
pose a grave danger to people and to the environment and that
sound policy demands that these sites be cleaned. The pertinent
question becomes "who should bear the economic burden of the
clean- up?"
Imposing response costs on the person who controls the prop-
erty and is directly benefited by the cleanup is reasonable and
is consistent with a landowner's common law liability. 149 Unless
a property owner acts to prevent hazardous waste releases from
its land, it is contributing to the releases, albeit by inaction. By
failing to act, thereby necessitating EPA intervention, the lender
is not an innocent owner.150 Moreover, Congress exempted the
147 See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
"4 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 146, § 11.4, at
356.
1'49 See infra text accompanying notes 190-238.
110 This was the basis for the court's holding in United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1983). In that case, the court held
that defendants, who acquired a parcel of property several years after dumping on the
property had stopped, were liable under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982), even though they had not dumped or permitted others to dump
wastes on the property. The reported opinion does not indicate that the court or the
parties considered the constitutionality of this imposition of liability. Compare Depart-
ment of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), in which the New Jersey Superior Court construed the
following definition of "discharge" in a state statute to require an act by the landowner:
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least blameworthy landowners by means of the third-party de-
fense. Thus, the courts should reject the argument that impo-
sition of liability on a lender/owner is a prima facie violation of
substantive due process.
The lender/owner's second due process argument, that CER-
CLA is unconstitutional retroactive legislation, is also flawed.
The Act does operate retroactively in the sense that it may
impose liability for actions taken before the Act's effective date.
CERCLA defendants may claim that they are being held liable
for conduct that they did not know would be actionable or
harmful at the time it was taken. If the waste generators and
transporters and the waste site owners acting before CERCLA's
effective date had known that they would be liable in the future
for response costs, they might have conducted their waste ac-
tivities in a manner designed to reduce or to avoid liability.151
Similarly, if a lender had known that it could be liable for
response costs if it acquired the waste site upon default in a
loan, it might have refused to lend against the security of that
land and might not have acquired the land to recover its loan.
One response to these arguments that avoids the constitu-
tional issue is that CERCLA does not impose liability for acts
committed before its effective date. Rather, CERCLA imposes
liability for the land's current condition and the damage it is
causing or threatening to cause. Supreme Court precedent sup-
ports this view: "A statute is not rendered retroactive merely
because the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action
depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent
to the enactment.' 152 Although some courts have interpreted
CERCLA and similar environmental acts in this manner,'53 this
"'Discharge' shall mean, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying or dumping." 151 N.J. Super. at 471, 376 A.2d at 1343. The court's
decision was based on rules of statutory construction, however, and not on a determi-
nation that the act would be unconstitutional if applied to an innocent landowner. 151
N.J. Super. at 471, 376 A.2d at 1343-44.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985);
Reply Memorandum of "Generator" Defendants and Amicus Curiae in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on Constitutional Grounds at 21, United States v. South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984).
152 Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 449 (1934).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Miami Drum Services Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1469, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1986); South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
at 984. See also Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1071-72, in which the court discussed a retroac-
tivity challenge to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(1982):
Defendants... observe that Section 7003 was not adopted and did not become
effective until 1976, and they argue that the statute was not meant to apply
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interpretation does not respond to the substance of the retroac-
tivity argument-that the defendant's actions were legal when
taken and that the defendant may have been unaware at the
time of the harmful effects that could result from its conduct.
Despite the argument's superficial appeal, it is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of protection
the due process clause provides against retroactive legislation.
Two relatively recent Supreme Court cases, Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Company 54 and Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration v. R.A. Gray & Company,155 demonstrate that even if
CERCLA is construed as applying retroactively, it is not un-
constitutional for that reason. In Usery, the Supreme Court
considered a substantive due process challenge that parallels
the challenge to CERCLA's retroactive aspects. The Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,156 as amended by the
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972,157 requires coal mine operators
to compensate, among others, any former employee disabled by
pneumoconiosis, even if the employee had terminated his or her
work in the industry before Congress enacted the 1969 Act.
Like defendants challenging CERCLA's retroactive liability
retroactively to acts that preceded that date. Hence, because the dumping of
toxic wastes at Price's Landfill ceased in 1972, defendants argue that the statute
cannot be used to impose liability on them.
We find this argument unpersuasive.... The gravamen of a Section 7003
action, as we have construed it, is not defendants' dumping practices, which
admittedly ceased with respect to toxic wastes in 1972, but the present immi-
nent hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e., leaking) of contaminants
into the groundwater. Thus, the statute neither punishes past wrongdoing nor
imposes liability for past acts. Rather, as defendants themselves argue, its
orientation is essentially prospective. When construed in this manner, the
statute simply is not retroactive. It merely relates to current and future
conditions.
Tri-County Landfill Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 41111. App. 3d 249, 353 N.E.2d
316 (1976) (application of Environmental Protection Act not retroactive because dis-
charges from the landfill occur presently); Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Illinois Pol-
lution Control Bd., 21 IlM. App. 3d 157, 313 N.E.2d 616 (1974) (pollution occurs at time
of discharge, not at time pollution source is created); United States v. Diamond Sham-
rock Corp., 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,819 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (though defen-
dant ceased disposal of hazardous waste four years prior to passage of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, imposition of liability is not retroactive because the
Act applies to presently existing conditions); Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Dep't
of Envtl. Resources, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978) (although appellants
created condition before passage of Clean Streams Law, they could be required to clean
present condition); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871(1974), appeal dismissed, Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 434 U.S. 807 (1977)
(imposing liability based on Clean Streams Law does not deny due process of law).
' 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
ISS 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
156 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
157 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (1982).
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scheme, the coal mine operators in Usery argued that holding
them liable for the disabilities of former employees violated the
operators' due process rights because liability was predicated
on completed acts that, when taken, were legal and, "at least in
part," were not known to be dangerous. 158
The Usery Court unequivocally rejected this argument. Al-
though the Court stated that the justifications supporting pro-
spective application of legislation might be insufficient to justify
its retroactive application, the Court applied a lower level of
scrutiny in reviewing the retroactive aspects of the legislation.
The facts that the defendants were unaware of the dangerous
nature of their activities and that they acted in reliance on the
current state of the law were factored into the Court's analysis
but were not deemed controlling in assessing the rationality of
the legislative scheme. The Usery Court held that "the imposi-
tion of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is
justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the em-
ployees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits
of their labor. ... ,159 CERCLA's retroactive impact can be
justified on similar grounds.
In 1984, the Court reaffirmed the Usery opinion in the R.A.
Gray case. In that case, the Court considered a substantive due
process challenge to the retroactive application of the Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (Pension Plan
Amendment) 160 to employers that had withdrawn from pension
plans before the Pension Plan Amendment's enactment. In re-
jecting the employers' due process challenge, the Court relied
heavily on Usery, stating that the Court in Usery "had little
difficulty" rejecting the due process challenge. 61 Although the
Court repeated the statement from Usery that a legitimate leg-
islative purpose must support retroactive application of legisla-
tion, the Court applied a lower level of scrutiny in reviewing
the sufficiency of that purpose and held: "[W]e believe it was
eminently rational for Congress to conclude that the purposes
of the [Pension Plan Amendment] could be more fully effec-
tuated if its withdrawal liability provisions were applied retro-
"I Usery, 428 U.S. at 15.
119 Id. at 18.
160 29 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982).
161 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729
(1984).
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actively.' 1 62 Thus, because the legislative purpose was enhanced
by its retroactive application, ,the lower level of review was
satisfied.
In light of the holdings in Usery and in R.A. Gray, the ret-
roactive aspect of CERCLA does not violate substantive due
process. Congress enacted CERCLA in response to the short-
comings of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 63
The imposition of response costs on those who benefited by the
dumping activities or by the cleanup is rational. Furthermore,
the publicized dangers of hazardous waste dumping and the
federal and state environmental legislation in force before CER-
CLA's enactment put lenders and other landowners on notice
of the potential for liability based on ownership of contaminated
land. By lending against the security of a waste site, the lender
assumed the risk that the land would be rendered valueless by
the release of hazardous pollutants. Protecting a defendant
lender from liability, though it was aware of a potential danger
when it made the loan, removes an important incentive for
socially responsible behavior. 164 For these reasons, courts that
have characterized CERCLA as retroactive legislation properly
have held that it does not violate substantive due process. 6
'16 Id. at 730.
1- 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). See Grad, supra note 15, at 35-36.
164 Toxic Waste Note, supra note 4, at 1559.
165 See, e.g., NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, .108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co.,
605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp, 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
The defendants in both the Shell Oil and Northeastern cases alternatively argued that
the government could not constitutionally charge them for response costs incurred
before CERCLA's effective date. Although the district courts in both cases indicated
that Congress constitutionally could have legislated such liabiity, the district courts
reached opposite results on the issue of pre-CERCLA response cost liability. Based on
its review of CERCLA's language and legislative history, the court in Shell Oil held
that Congress intended to hold responsible parties liable for pre-enactment government
response costs. The court summarily dismissed the defendant's argument that to do so
would be unconstitutional:
Once it is accepted that Shell may be liable for its pre-CERCLA acts, it is
irrelevant, from a due process, perspective, whether the government com-
menced cleanup before or after the Act became law on December 11, 1980.
There are no serious due process concerns in holding responsible parties liable
for pre-CERCLA response costs.
605 F. Supp. at 1073.
The district court in Northeastern, on the other hand, rejected such liability, finding
that CERCLA does not expressly authorize recovery of such costs. The court indicated,
however, that Congress could have done so.
Although it was possible for Congress to legislate the liability of past gen-
erators and transporters for pre-CERCLA response costs, they did not and
this Court does not deem it advisable to engage in judicial legislation concerning
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2. Taking Clause Challenges
In addition to a substantive due process claim, CERCLA's
retroactive aspect could trigger a taking claim by a lender that
acquired a mortgage before CERCLA's effective date. Although
the Supreme Court stated in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City'66 that taking cases involve "ad hoe, factual
inquiries,"'167 an admission it recently repeated in Keystone Bi-
tuminous Cpal Association v. De Benedictis,168 a lender has
strong authority for its assertion that federal law can cause an
unconstitutional taking of lien rights. In United States v. Secu-
rity Industrial Bank,169 Armstrong v. United States,170 and Louis-
ville Bank v. Radford,171 the Supreme Court reviewed taking
challenges to laws that destroyed or substantially destroyed pre-
existing liens. In Armstrong and in Radford, the Court held that
an unconstitutional taking had occurred. In Security Industrial
Bank, the Court sidestepped the issue by construing the statute
to apply only prospectively because "substantial doubt" existed
that etroactive application would survive the taking challenge.
Armed with this authority, a lender holding a pre-CERCLA
lien on a waste site could argue that retroactive application of
CERCLA is a taking of its mortgage lien. The most important
right'granted in a mortgage is the right to sell the property upon
the borrower's default to recoup the loan amount. 72 If the mort-
a statute of such importance and controversy. All doubts of retroactive appli-
cation must be resolved in favor of the defendants; therefore, the defendants
are not liable for pre-CERCLA response costs.
579 F. Stpp. at 843. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed this portion of the district
court decision on the basis of the district court's reasoning in Shell Oil. See also United
States V. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that federal courts rpay
create federal common law when necessary to protect uniquely federal interests).
1- 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
167 Id. at 124. The Court went on to say:
Tihis Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain dis-
proportionately concentrated on a few persons.... Indeed, we have frequently
observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the
government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends
largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."
Id.
'~' 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987).
,69 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
'~o 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
171 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
272 If the lender cannot foreclose the mortgage, it is virtually valueless. The other
rights the mortgage grants the lender, such as the right to ensure that property taxes
and insurance premiums remain current, are of no consequence to the lender unless it
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gaged land contains hazardous wastes, the lender will argue that
the specter of section 107 liability effectively destroys its right
to foreclose on the property by requiring the foreclosure sale
purchaser to acquire CERCLA liability along with title. The
purchaser potentially will be liable for response costs far in
excess of the property's uncontaminated value unless the pur-
chaser qualifies for the limited third-party defense. Because the
lender is normally the only bidder at the foreclosure sale and
because, as described above, 173 a lender will have difficulty
qualifying for the third-party defense, a lender may argue that
CERCLA effectively destroys its security.
A fundamental flaw in the lender's taking argument is that it
focuses on the decrease in the value of its collateral, rather than
on an allegation that CERCLA deprives it of a legally protected
property interest. Although CERCLA may affect the value of
the collateral, it does not affect the mortgage lien. This is not a
mere technicality. The lender retains its lien until the debt is
paid or the lender forecloses. It also retains the benefits of the
mortgage covenants and the common law and statutory rights
afforded mortgagees. For example, if the state where the land
is located is a title theory or intermediate theory jurisdiction, in
which a mortgage conveys title to the encumbered land to the
lender, the lender can take possession of the property even
before foreclosing. Additionally, the lender retains whatever
rights are created by state law for the appointment of a receiver
to take possession of the property. All the legal rights associated
with the mortgage lien remain valid.
The continued vitality of the mortgage lien distinguishes a
taking challenge to CERCLA from the successful taking chal-
lenges involved in the three major Supreme Court lien cases. In
Security Industrial Bank, the Court reviewed a federal law that
authorized complete destruction of pre-existing liens. 174 In Arm-
can foreclose. The mortgage covenants are almost all directed to maintaining the value
of the collateral, which the lender is concerned with only as long as it retains the right
to sell the property.
As further evidence of the importance of the right to foreclose, once a mortgage has
been foreclosed, it is characterized as being functus officio. See, e.g., Cross Cos., Inc.
v. Citizens Mortgage Inv. Trust, 305 Minn. 111, 232 N.W.2d 114, 117-18 (1975). Thus,
even if the foreclosure sale proceeds were insufficient to pay the loan in full, so that a
portion of the debt remains outstanding, the mortgage is extinguished because it has
served its primary function.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 115-43.
'7 459 U.S. 70 (1982). This case consolidated seven bankruptcy cases, in which each
bankrupt debtor used an exemption created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
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strong, although the plaintiffs' pre-existing liens were not tech-
nically destroyed, they were rendered totally unenforceable as
a matter of law. 175 Radford involved a federal law that stripped
void a lien that had been created before that Act's effective date. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)
(1982). The lienors challenged this retroactive application of § 522(f)(2) as a violation
of the taking clause. The Court did not decide the constitutional issue. Instead, it relied
on the rule of statutory construction that, if "fairly possible," the court should construe
a statute in a manner that avoids a constitutional issue. Although the statutory language
gave no indication that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Reform Act to apply only
prospectively, the Court so construed it because "there is substantial doubt whether the
retroactive destruction of the appellees' liens in this case comports with the Fifth
Amendment." 459 U.S. at 78.
The Court distinguished a creditor's contractual right to repayment of the debt from
the property right it acquires in the collateral by virtue of the lien. Although Congress
is constitutionally empowered to impair contract rights retroactively in connection with
bankruptcy proceedings, the Fifth Amendment is a check on Congress' power in dealing
with property rights. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[Hlowever 'rational' the exercise of the
bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the question whether the
enactment takes property within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment." 459 U.S. at
75. Because § 522(f)(2) provided for destruction of property rights that existed when
the statute became effective, the Court determined that a substantial taking issue existed.
In an interesting concurrence, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, argued that the Court should reach the taking issue. Despite the Bankruptcy
Reform Act's clear operation to destroy the pre-existing liens involved in that case,
Justice Blackmun stated that he would hold that the Bankruptcy Reform Act did not
cause a taking:
because the exemptions in question are limited as to kinds of property and as
to values; because the amount loaned has little or no relationship to the value
of the property; because these asserted lien interests come close to being
contracts of adhesion; because repossessions by small loan companies in this
kind of situation are rare; because the purpose of the statute is salutary and is
to give the debtor a fresh start with a minimum for necessities; because there
has been creditor abuse; because Congress merely has adjusted priorities, and
has not taken for the Government's use or for public use; because the exemp-
tion provisions in question affect the remedy and not the debt; because the
security interest seems to have little direct value and weight in its own right
and appears useful mainly as a convenient tool with which to threaten the
debtor to reaffirm the underlying obligation; because the statute is essentially
economic regulation and insubstantial at that; and because there is an element
of precedent favorable to the debtor in such cases as Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.
Id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Blackmun's most persuasive argument is that a taking did not occur because the lien
was an unenforceable part of an unconscionable transaction. The other factors stated
in the concurrence, however, are contrary to established taking jurisprudence. For
example, that the statute is "essentially economic legislation" is irrelevant in determining
whether a compensable taking has occurred. Id. Similarly, the absence of governmental
or public use is irrelevant as long as a public purpose exists. See Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
' 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). In Armstrong, the plaintiffs acquired mechanics' liens in
property subsequently acquired by the federal government. Although the liens were still
valid after the government's acquisition, they were unenforceable because of sovereign
immunity. The Court held that, although the liens were still valid: "The total destruction
by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute compensable property,
has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking'...."
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a mortgagee of its most important lien rights. 176 In contrast,
CERCLA does not alter a mortgagee's lien rights. Because no
property right is affected, the taking clause does not apply.
Even on its own terms, the lender's argument is fundamen-
tally flawed. The substance of the lender's complaint is that
CERCLA decreases the value of its collateral. The simple an-
swer is that CERCLA did not destroy the property's value-
the dumping activities did. Regardless of the existence of CER-
CLA, a leaking hazardous waste site is a liability rather than an
asset. As described in Part III of this Article, a landowner has
an independent common law duty to abate hazardous conditions
on. its property and is responsible for damages resulting from
those conditions. The government is not in violation of the
taking clause when it acts to abate a public nuisance.17 Based
on the above analysis, CERCLA does not effect a taking
whether it is applied prospectively or retroactively.
1-6 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935). In Radford, the Court held unconstitutional a Bank-
ruptcy Act amendment that applied only retroactively. The amendment, enacted during
the 1930s depression, permitted a bankrupt debtor under certain circumstances to
eliminate a lien on its land for less than the outstanding debt amount. If the lender
consented, the Bankruptcy Act permitted a borrower, upon being adjudged bankrupt,
to purchase the encumbered property at its then appraised value and provided for
deferred purchase payments bearing interest at the rate of one per cent per annum. If
the lender did not consent to the purchase, the borrower could obtain a five year stay
on all proceedings against the land and retain possession of the property in exchange
for payment of annual rent. At any time during the five year period, the borrower could
pay the lender the appraised value for the property and thereby eliminate the lien.
The Court held that the amendment was an unconstitutional taking because it deprived
the -lender of the following property rights:
1. The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only to the
discretion of the court.
4. The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale
whenever held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property devoted
primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds
of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself.
5. The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default,
subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits
collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.
Id. at 594-95.
The Court found that the only right left to the lender under the mortgage was the
right to retain the lien until the borrower exercised its right to release the lien by paying
the property's appraised value, which was less than the outstanding debt amount. Id.
at 596. The Court held that, because the amendment destroyed "rights in specific
property which are of substantial value," it violated the taking clause. Id. at 601.
171 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See also Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1246 n.22 (1987); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINOS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112 (1985); Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
pensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967).
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3. Contractual Impairment Challenges
The lender's final constitutional challenge to CERCLA's lia-
bility scheme asserts that the Act effects an unconstitutional
impairment of contractual relations. While a challenge based on
the contract clause can be readily dismissed because the con-
tract clause does not apply to federal legislation,1 78 the federal
government's right to interfere with contractual rights is re-
stricted by the Fifth Amendment due process clause.179 This
protection, however, is far less substantial than that which the
contract clause provides against state legislation.18 0 As stated
by the Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company:1 81
When the contract is a private one, and when the impairing
statute is a federal one,. . . inquiry is especially limited, and
the judicial scrutiny quite minimal. The party asserting a
Fifth Amendment due process violation must overcome a
presumption of constitutionality and "establish that the leg-
islature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."
Because CERCLA's liability scheme is closely tailored to its
legislative goals, 182 a lender will find it difficult, if not impossible,
to establish that the scheme is either arbitrary or irrational.
Moreover, a contract impairment challenge is flawed in the
same manner as a taking challenge. The basis for the lender's
contract challenge is that the threat of CERCLA liability impairs
its ability to enforce its loan contract. Such a challenge should
fail, however, because CERCLA does not alter the terms of the
loan agreement. The lender retains its right to pursue anyone
personally liable for the debt. CERCLA merely allocates liabil-
ity for the cost of eliminating a hazardous condition.
7 The grounds for dismissal are contained in the clause's express terms: "No State
shall... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10 (emphasis added). Because CERCLA is federal rather than state legislation, it is
not subject to the prohibition of the contract clause. At least two federal district courts
have rejected contract clause challenges to CERCLA by non-lenders on this ground.
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 214 (D. Mo. 1985); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,388 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
179 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80 As the Supreme Court stated: "We have never held ... that the principles em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause are coextensive with prohibitions
existing against state impairments of pre-existing contracts." Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984).
181 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
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Lenders in six states, however, have a more substantial ar-
gument that CERCLA impairs their contractual rights to recover
outstanding debts. California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, and Utah have statutory one-action rules.8 3 The one-
action rule provides that, in the event of default, the lender must
foreclose on the encumbered land as a prerequisite to a suit to
recover the amount outstanding under the loan agreement.',,
The rule is designed to force lenders to attempt to recover the
debt from the collateral securing it before pursuing the borrow-
er's other assets. 185 Lenders in states with one-action rules might
claim that CERCLA's imposition of liability on innocent prop-
erty owners effectively prevents the lender from foreclosing
because the foreclosing lender usually is the only bidder at the
foreclosure sale. As the only bidder, the lender usually acquires
title to the foreclosed property However, no lender will wish
to acquire title if the property is a hazardous waste site poten-
tially subject to a CERCLA cleanup action. Under these cir-
cumstances, the lender is effectively prevented from suing to
recover the debt.
The above argument lacks force for three reasons. First, a
lender is not legally required to bid for the property at the
foreclosure sale, although it normally does so. As long as the
lender conducts the foreclosure according to normal procedures,
the one-action rule should be satisfied even if no one purchases
the property because the lender attempted to satisfy the debt
from the property. 8 6 The lender then can seek a judgment for
the debt against anyone who is personally liable for it.
Second, a court may excuse the lender from conducting the
sale before seeking a judgment on the note. Courts in five of
the six states with a one-action rule have created an exception
to the rule's application for property that has become value-
'83 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1987) (although § 726, by its terms,
applies only to mortgages, courts have construed it to apply to trust deeds as well, see,
e.g., Bank of California Nat'l Ass'n v. Leone, 37 Cal. App. 3d 444, 112 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1974)); IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1986); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 40.430 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-2 to -2.3 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1987). Although the New Jersey one-action rule applies
only to certain types of residential properties, residences surprisingly have been built
on former hazardous waste dump sites.
,84 G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.2, at 598 (2d ed.
1985).
18 Id.
"6 United States v. Caprice, 427 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D.N.J. 1976).
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less. 187 This judicially created exception is designed to excuse
the lender from an exercise in futility. Although no one yet has
asserted this exception when pollution has destroyed the prop-
erty value, the rationale for the rule will be served by extending
it to this situation. Thus, a lender holding a security interest in
a hazardous waste site should be able to avoid the foreclosure
requirement if it can establish that the wastes have rendered the
land valueless because of potential response costs.
Finally, if the property is generating income, a lender may be
able to recover the debt without foreclosing and then suing those
who are personally liable. Each state with a one-action rule
provides lenders with the right to petition a court for appoint-
ment of a receiver.188 A receiver can protect the land from
187 The five states are:
1) California: The California one-action statute provides: "There can be but one form
of action for the recovery of any debt.., secured by mortgage .... In the action the
court may ... direct the sale of the property .... CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a)
(West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). Use of the word "may" indicates that the court
has discretion not to require a foreclosure sale. See also Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Taylor,
17 Cal. App. 3d 346, 353, 94 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (1971) (holding that where creditor has
no security interest in debtor's real property or security becomes valueless, creditor is
not required to foreclose by statute providing only one form of action, foreclosure, on
debt secured by a mortgage); Comment, Mortgages and Trust Deeds: Foreclosure Sale
of a Portion of the Mortgaged Premises: Remedies Open to the Mortgagee When the
Security is Valueless: Pleading the Existence of Security, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 469, 473-
77 (1937). But see Jeanese, Inc. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 449, 455,
1 Cal. Rptr. 752, 755 (1960) (holding that a purchase money lender always must foreclose
even if the security has become valueless).
2) Idaho: Edminster v. Van Eaton, 57 Idaho 115, 117-19, 63 P.2d 154, 155 (1936) (holding
that statutory one-action rule does not preclude mortgagee from suing in independent
action on note for which security was given, where security has become valueless);
Warner v. Bookstahler, 48 Idaho 419, 282 P. 862 (1929) (holding that foreclosure of first
mortgage without redemption and issuance of sheriff's deed exhausted security as to
junior mortgagee); Berry v. Scott, 43 Idaho 789, 255 P. 305 (1927) (holding that one
action rule provides only remedy for recovery of debt and enforcement rights secured
by mortgage, unless it can be shown that the security is valueless).
3) Montana: Bailey v. Hansen, 105 Mont. 552, 74 P.2d 438 (1937) (holding that one
action rule does not prohibit a personal action where the security given the creditor has
become valueless without any fault on his part, in which event he may secure an
attachment).
4) Nevada: McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 82 Nev. 117, 122, 412 P.2d 604, 606
(1966) (holding that attachment statute may be utilized if security, without fault of the
mortgagee or beneficiary, has become valueless).
5) Utah: Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983) (recognizing
an exception to the one-action rule where the security interest in the property has been
depleted and is valueless through no fault of the mortgagee).
183 California: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564 (West Supp. 1987); Cormack & Irsfeld,
Applications of the Distinction Between Mortgages and Trust Deeds in California, 26
CALIF. L. Rv. 206, 211-18 (1938); Comment, Comparison of California Mortgages
and Trust Deeds and Land Sale Contracts, 7 UCLA L. REv. 83, 91-94 (1960).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 8-601 (1979).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-102 (1986).
Nevada: NEv. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 32.010 (Michie 1986); Bowler v. Leonard, 70 Nev.
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further waste and can apply the income generated by the prop-
erty to payment of property expenses, including the outstanding
loan amount. 18 9 In this way, the lender may avoid the problem
presented by the one-action rule and still recover the outstand-
ing loan amount. For these reasons, the one-action rule will not
provide lenders with a successftil contract impairment defense.
Therefore, like the substantive due process and taking clause
arguments, the lender's impairment of contract theory is un-
availing. CERCLA does not eliminate or modify any of the
lender's rights pursuant to the debt contract. Although CER-
CLA renders foreclosure and purchase a less desirable means
of recouping the debt, the substantial public good achieved by
CERCLA's statutory scheme militates against a finding that this
scheme is arbitrary or capricious. Realistically, therefore, the
only potentially successful defense that a lender can assert to
avoid CERCLA liability as an owner is the narrowly defined
third-party defense.
III. COMMON LAW LIABILITY
Lenders have reacted so strongly to potential CERCLA
liability in part because courts rarely have held them
liable for their borrowers' activities. Injured parties have
attempted to recover damages from lenders for their borrow-
ers' actions on a number of theories, including that the
borrower had acted as the lender's instrtmentality'O or
370, 382-84, 269 P.2d 833, 839 (1954); Electrical Prod. Corp. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Ct., 55 Nev. 8, 11-13, 23 P.2d 501, 503 (1933).
New Jersey: Sweeney v. Grant Silk Mfg. Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 321, 182 A. 484, aff'd,
120 N.J. Eq. 607, 187 A. 374 (1936).
Utah: UTAH R. Civ. P. 66 (1987).
,89 While beyond the scope of this Article, ajudicially established receivership creates
an interesting issue concerning the receiver's liability for response costs as an "operator"
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982).
'9 United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing
the factors courts donsider when determining whether one entity is the instrumentality
or alter ego of another); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp.,
483 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[Ifn the cases resulting in instrumentality liability
for the creditor, the facts have unmistakably shown that the subservient corporation
was being used to further the purposes of the dominant corporation and that the
subservient corporation in reality had no separate, independent existence of its own.");
Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916) (holding that
where one corporation owns or controls the entire property of another, and operates
its plant and conducts its business as a department of its own business, it is responsible
for the obligations of the controlled corporation); James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore
Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Pa. 1985) (holding that total and actual control
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agent,' 91 or that the borrower and lender had been joint ventur-
ers. 192 The case law that has developed with respect to these
theories requires a plaintiff to establish such total control of the
borrower or active lender involvement that the wrongful con-
duct, though nominally committed by the borrower, in fact was
committed by the lender.193 In the usual loan transaction, a
lender's activities will be insufficient to trigger this common law
liability, even though the lender's activities may have been suf-
ficient to trigger CERCLA liability as an operator.
A vital distinction exists, however, between a lender's liability
during the life of the loan and a lender/owner's CERCLA lia-
bility. The lender/owner's CERCLA liability is not based on the
loan relationship. Liability is triggered by the lender's property
ownership. 94 Viewed in this light, the lender/owner's CERCLA
liability is consistent with well established common law princi-
must be established to render a general contractor the instrumentality of the bonding
corporation). See also Duff v. Southern Ry. Co., 496 So. 2d 760, 762-63 (Ala. 1986)
(holding that the question whether employer was an instrumentality of railroad was a
question of fact precluding summary judgment); Miller v. Dixon Indus., 513 A.2d 597,
604-05 (R.I. 1986) (stating that the mere fact that there exists a parent-subsidiary
relationship between two corporations is insufficient reason to impose liability on the
parent either for the torts of the subsidiary or for a contract breached by the subsidiary);
In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 454 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986)
(holding that creditor's action against debtor's parent corporation and against principal
of both corporations seeking to pierce corporate veil under alter ego theory was not
property of the bankruptcy estate and was not a claim assertable by debtor or trustee).
But see In re Mercer Trucking Co., 16 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding
trustees had standing to assert alter ego status of creditor vis-a-vis debtors).
191 A. Gay Jenson Farms, Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14-o comment a (1958). See Save Way Oil Co.
v. Mehlman, 115 A.D.2d 721, 496 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1986); B.A. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co.,
78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960).
192 Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, 52 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. 1952) (listing the four
elements that must be satisfied to find a joint venture). See also Atlanta Shipping Corp.
v. Chemical Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing joint venturer claim
on the basis that a transaction involving a loan of money and creating a debtor-creditor
relationship will not of itself make lender and borrower joint venturers); Connor v.
Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375, 447 P.2d 609, 615 (1968) (dismissing
joint venturer claim because association between builder and contractor did not include
agreement to share profits and losses either might realize or suffer); Meyers v. Postal
Finance, 287 N.W.2d 614, 617-18 (Minn. 1979) (holding that assignee was not liable-for
club's alleged misrepresentations solely because of its status as assignee); Holts v.
Tillman, 480 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1985) (holding that attorney's conduct did not establish
intent to form a joint venture with property owners and that to establish such a joint
venture would require a showing that attorney has a proprietary interest in lease
agreement).
193 For an exposition of these and other theories of lender liability, see S. Nickles,
Lender Liability: Major Theories, Minnesota Continuing Legal Education 1986 Bank-
ruptcy Institute (Sept. 18-19, 1986 Minneapolis, Minn.).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
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ples regardless of the involuntary nature of the lender's acqui-
sition of the land.
Three common law actions-strict liability, nuisance, and
trespass-are the direct forebears of CERCLA liability and
often provide additional sources of liability for a potential CER-
CLA defendant. In each of these common law causes of action,
particularly strict liability and nuisance, a property owner is
liable for injuries resulting from the use of its land. The owner's
absence of moral culpability is virtually irrelevant. Instead, the
theory for imposing such stringent liability is to prevent injuries
and, failing that, to ensure compensation for victims. 195
A. Strict Liability
The most direct common law forebear of the CERCLA lia-
bility scheme is strict liability. Although strict product liability
has evolved primarily during the past quarter century, the con-
cept of strict liability originated more than a century ago. The
doctrine developed in large part from the 1868 English decision,
Rylands v. Fletcher.196 The facts in that case parallel the factual
settings in which CERCLA liability accrues.
In Rylands, the owners of a mill retained a contractor to
construct a reservoir on their land. 197 Unknown to the owners,
the reservoir was located over abandoned mine shafts. When
the reservoir was partially filled with water, the water broke
through the shafts, traveled through connecting passages, and
damaged the plaintiff's property. 198 Despite the defendants' ab-
sence of moral culpability, the Court held them liable, employing
language that applies with equal force to a hazardous waste site:
[I]f the defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their
[land], had desired to use it for any purpose which I may
term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into
95 Although a site owner liable under CERCLA also often will be liable under one of
these common law actions, CERCLA potentially provides important litigation advan-
tages. CERCLA authorizes action against a site owner whenever "there may be an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). In contrast, a plaintiff suing a site owner under
one of the common law causes of action faces more difficult causation and procedural
barriers. For a description of these problems, see Farber, supra note 22.
19 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
"9 Although the mill owners only leased the land on which their mill was located, the
Court treated them as owning the land for purposes of the opinion. Id. at 338.
198 Although the plaintiff's and defendants' properties were not adjoining, the court
treated them as being so. Id. at 337.
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the [land] that which, in its natural condition, was not in or
upon it-for the purpose of introducing water, either above
or below ground, in quantities and in a manner not the result
of any work or operation on or under the land, and if in
consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any
imperfection in the mode of their doing so, the water came
to escape and to pass off into the [land] of the plaintiff, then
it appears to me that that which the defendants were doing
they were doing at their own peril; and if in the course of
their doing it the evil arose ... of the escape of the water,
and its passing away to the [land] of the plaintiff and injuring
the plaintiff-then ... the defendants would be liable.199
If the term "hazardous waste" is substituted for the word
"water" in this quotation, this passage describes the basic CER-
CLA liability scheme and demonstrates that a site owner could
be held strictly liable under the common law for injuries caused
by hazardous wastes from its site.
The concept of strict liability for nonnatural uses of land
quickly took root in America. In fact, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court applied the doctrine to a case involving
percolating water in the same year that Rylands was decided. 200
Three years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
doctrine to another case involving underground water.20 1 Al-
though the course of the doctrine's development has not always
been a straight one, the strict liability concept is now a well-
established part of our liability jurisprudence.20 2 The First and
Second Restatements of Torts both provide that a landowner is
strictly liable for harm caused by hazardous activities on its
land.20 3 The First Restatement defines this liability in terms of
"ultrahazardous activity, ' '204 whereas the Second Restatement
defines it in terms of "abnormally dangerous activity. '20 5 Such
'9 Id. at 339.
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
211 Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871).
202 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 78 (5th ed. 1984).
203 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519
(1979).
2' Section 520 provides that:
An activity is ultrahazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
205 Section 520 currently provides that:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
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differences in terminology and in the precise parameters of lia-
bility under the First and Second Restatements are immaterial,
however, when applied to a waste site that is releasing hazard-
ous materials into waterways and neighboring lands. Dumping
wastes that can seriously interfere with life and with the envi-
ronment is an ultrahazardous and abnormally dangerous
activity.2 06
The policy underpinnings of these common law concepts and
of CERCLA are the same. Both attempt to ensure that situations
that are dangerous to society are avoided or cured. The methods
adopted to achieve this goal also are the same. By unavoidably
tying liability to such an objective standard as property title,
recourse and remedy are virtually guaranteed. Most important,
the strict liability rule gives a property owner clear notice that
it will be liable for injuries resulting from hazardous conditions
on its land. The owner thus has a strong incentive to conduct
its activities in a manner that will eliminate or reduce injuries.
If injuries nevertheless result, the property owner is easily iden-
tifiable and owns at least one asset-the land-that can be ap-
plied to satisfy a judgment against it. In contrast, a person who
does not own the land but merely conducts the operation, such
as an independent contractor or lessee, may be difficult to locate
or may be judgment proof. Thus, CERCLA may be viewed as
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979).
Although the Second Restatement characterizes this form of liability as being strict,
the defendant's blameworthiness is inherent in a determination that the activity was
abnormally dangerous under the factors set forth in § 520.
[The § 520 factors] consider the place where the activity is carried on, or
consider alternatives to the activity. Such considerations permit notions of fault
to get in by the back door, because the choice of place, the question of
appropriateness of the activity to a particular place, or choices in the manner
of conducting the activity invariably import notions of duty of care, responsi-
bility and fault. This, in turn, places the heavy burden of proof back on the
plaintiff.
REPORT OF THE SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP K-16, quoted in D. FARBER, Toxic TORTS
AND VICTIM'S COMPENSATION PROPOSALS 3 (1985).
1 Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150(1983). The court interpreted the Second Restatement as incorporating the Rylands test.
Id. at 157. See also THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); Comment,
Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?,
13 RUTGERS L.J. 329, 330-31 n.6 (1982).
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a codification of common law strict liability, although it provides
a third-party defense for innocent owners that did not exist at
common law.
B. Nuisance
CERCLA's other forebears is nuisance doctrine. 2 7 Like strict
liability, nuisance imposes liability based on property owner-
ship. Long before environmental protection statutes existed,
nuisance doctrine prohibited a property owner from using its
land in a way that unreasonably interferes with a right common
to the general public (public nuisance)2 8 or with another prop-
erty owner's use and enjoyment of its land (private nuisance).2°9
A leaking hazardous waste site constitutes both a public and a
private nuisance under common law.
The Second Restatement's definition of a public nuisance
states that an interference is unreasonable if: (1) it involves a
significant interference with the public health, safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience; (2) the conduct is proscribed by law;
or (3) the conduct is continuing or has produced a long-lasting
effect and, as the defendant knows or has reason to know, has
a significant effect upon the public right.210 Because CERCLA
authorizes EPA to clean a site and to charge the owner for
response costs only after the site has been identified as pres-
enting an imminent and substantial danger to the public health,211
any site subject to CERCLA cleanup also would constitute a
public nuisance under the common law.212 Thus, CERCLA lia-
bility is, in a sense, a codification of a specific instance of
common law public nuisance and serves the same preventive
and compensatory goals.
The Second Restatement of Torts defines a private nuisance
as "a structure or other condition erected or created on [one's]
2 One commentator has described nuisance as "the common law backbone of modem
environmental law." THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT, supra note 1, at 23.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
209 Id. § 821D. Comment a to § 821D states that the private nuisance action dates to
the twelfth century.2 10 Id. § 821B.
211 42 U.S.C. § 9604(1) (1982).
212 See THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT, supra note 1, at 23-24; Comment, supra note 206,
at 329-32; Comment, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Haz-
ardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 125-28 (1980) [hereinafter Comment,
Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries].
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land which causes a continuing invasion of [another's] land. '213
If a dump site has leaked hazardous wastes onto neighboring
lands, the dump site owner may be held liable for damages
caused on neighboring lands. Thus, neighboring landowners
may sue the site owner on a private nuisance cause of action.,
C. Trespass
Trespass is the third of CERCLA's common law antecedents
and an additional cause of action upon which lender/owners
may be sued. Though it is a more limited action than CERCLA,
trespass liability more closely parallels the CERCLA liability of
an innocent owner than does strict liability or nuisance. Like
CERCLA, a trespass action focuses on land ownership. Liabil-
ity in trespass, however, is less than strict. To establish a cause
of action for trespass, a plaintiff must prove not only that pol-
lutants physically invaded its land, 214 but also that the defendant
knowingly or negligently caused the invasion. 215
Some courts have held that constructive notice to the defen-
dant may be sufficient to support liability in trespass. 216 How-
ever, at least one court has held that a defendant was not liable
in trespass even though he intentionally discharged pollutants
on his land, because he did not know that subterranean currents
or other conditions would carry the pollutants to the plaintiff's
land.217 In light of the problems of proof and the availability of
alternative theories of recovery, plaintiffs rarely rely on the
trespass theory even if their land or water has been damaged
by pollutants. 218 The trespass theory, however, like strict liabil-
ity and nuisance, demonstrates that under traditional notions a
property owner may be held liable for injuries caused by con-
ditions on its land. CERCLA's liability scheme reflects this same
notion.
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 201 comment b (1979).
214 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 594 (4th ed. 1971).
215 Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 6-7, 566 P.2d 175, 177 (1977); see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1979).
216 Elsey v. Adirondack & St. L. Ry. Co., 97 Misc. 273, 277, 161 N.Y.S. 391, 393
(Sup. Ct. 1916); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 258 Or. 494, 513, 466 P.2d 605, 615
(1970).
217 Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1954).
218 Comment, Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, supra note 212, at 126.
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D. Negligence
Unlike strict liability, nuisance, and trespass, negligence fo-
cuses less on property ownership in the hazardous waste context
than on duty. A suit for negligence will lie against the owner of
a hazardous waste site if the owner breached a duty of reason-
able care owed to the plaintiff, thereby proximately causing a
foreseeable injury to the plaintiff.219 The focus on foreseeability
distinguishes negligence from CERCLA's basic liability scheme,
although foreseeability does affect the availability of the third-
party defense. An innocent owner can qualify for that defense
only if it exercised due care, which inevitably requires an anal-
ysis of the foreseeability of the injury.
The dangerous nature of hazardous waste sites and the gravity
of the injuries that can result from their negligent operation or
maintenance place a high standard of care on a site owner.220
Thus, if hazardous materials are escaping from the site, partic-
ularly to the degree necessary to prompt an EPA cleanup, a
plaintiff in a private action for negligence may be able to estab-
lish that the defendant did not satisfy its duty of reasonable
care.2 21 The unique characteristics of hazardous waste litigation,
however, may enable the site owner to escape liability for neg-
ligence although it might be unable to do so under CERCLA.
A defendant, particularly one that owned the site before the
dangers of pollution were fully recognized and while disposal
techniques were less effective, might avoid liability for negli-
gence by establishing that it acted reasonably in light of the state
of knowledge and technology at that time. Thus, the basic CER-
CLA liability scheme is more closely related to strict liability
and to nuisance than to negligence.
E. Successor Owner Liability
As established by the above analysis, the common law im-
poses tort liability on a property owner that creates a hazardous
waste site that causes injury. Whether a subsequent site owner
also is liable, though no dumping occurred during its ownership,
219 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 202, § 30, at 164-65.
220 Id. at 171; Comment, Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, supra note 212, at
123.
221 See, e.g., Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604, 606 (La.
Ct. App. 1978).
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is more problematic. Like CERCLA, the common law does not
exempt a property purchaser from liability solely because it did
not create the hazard or because it owned the site for only a
short time before the injury occurred. Under common law, the
purchaser is liable if it knew or should have known of the wastes
and if it had a reasonable opportunity to correct the condition. 222
In case after case, courts have held property purchasers liable
for injuries resulting from artificial conditions that existed on
the land when the purchasers acquired the property.2 23
The most frequently cited case on this issue is Palmore v.
Morris.2 2 4 In Palmore, a boy was injured when a negligently
maintained gate fell on him. The accident occurred twenty hours
after the property on which the gate was located had been sold.
In holding that the purchaser, rather than the seller, was liable
for the boy's injuries, the court stated:
Before he purchased the real estate, the law presumes the
grantee examined the property, and was cognizant of its
situation, surroundings, the character of the structures upon
it, and their condition of repair. Without an express covenant
by the grantors, as between them and the grantee, there was
no duty on the grantors to repair. The purchaser thereafter
assumed that duty because he then became the owner and
occupant.... There may be a case where the grantor con-
ceals from the grantee a defect in a structure, known to him
alone, and not discoverable by careful inspection, that the
owner would be held liable, though out of possession; but
that is not this case.225
The case presents a species of title liability. Under this anal-
ysis, whether the vendee created the condition or affirmatively
contributed to it is irrelevant. Rather, the vendee's possession
222 Section 336 of the Second Restatement of Torts provides:
One who takes possession of land upon which there is an existing structure or
other artificial condition unreasonably dangerous to persons or property outside
of the land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the
condition after, but only after,
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition, and
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those
affected by it, and
(c) he has failed, after a reasonable opportunity, to make it safe or otherwise
to protect such persons against it.
RES rATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 366 (1979). See also id. § 839.
22 See, e.g., Central Consumers' Co. v. Pinkert, 122 Ky. 720, 92 S.W. 957 (1906);
Palmore v. Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 37 A. 995 (1895); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984); Annotation, Liability of Purchaser of Premises for Nuisance
Thereon Created by Predecessor, 14 A.L.R. 1094 (1921).
37 A. 995 (1895).
225 Id. at 999.
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and control of the land is dispositive. Again, responsibility fol-
lows title without more:
Any future possession [by the seller] in face of his deed,
unless there be an independent stipulation to the contrary,
would be a palpable trespass; and with his surrender of
possession all the duties incident to ownership, as to him,
were at an end. From the moment [the purchaser] took
possession under his deed the duties theretofore incumbent
on [the seller] were transferred to him, and he became an-
swerable to the public for neglect in their performance. 226
Because the vendee has exclusive control over the land through
the acquisition of title, it is liable at common law for injuries
resulting from harmful conditions on the land.
A few states have adopted statutes codifying this common
law principle. 227 For example, section 7.48.170 of the Washing-
ton Revised Code provides: "Every successive owner of prop-
erty who neglects to abate a continuing nuisance upon or in the
use of such property caused by a former owner, is liable there-
fore in the same manner as the one who first created it.
228
Courts have not afforded lenders any special protection from
the operation of these statutes. In Pierce v. German Savings &
Loan Society, 2 9 for example, the California Supreme Court
applied a similar statute to hold a mortgagee that acquired title
to the encumbered land liable for damages resulting from a
nuisance that existed on the land before the lender acquired it.210
Thus, lenders that acquire title are no more shielded by their
status as lenders than are any other property purchasers.
CERCLA's withholding of lender immunity parallels the com-
mon law. A lender that acquires title to a waste site normally
will be liable under the common law rule of vendee liability in
the same circumstances that it will be liable under CERCLA.
As under CERCLA, an institutional lender's sophistication and
expertise with respect to land will make it difficult for the lender
to avoid common law liability by claiming absence of notice. 231
On the other hand, if the lender successfully establishes the lack
of notice defense, it will be exempt from liability not only under
226 Id. at 998-99.
27 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3483 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 52-109 (1979);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.170 (1961).
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 7.48170 (1961).
29 72 Cal. 180, 13 P. 478 (1887).
230 Id. at 479.
231 See supra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
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the common law, but also under the third-party defense to CER-
CLA liability.
CERCLA and the common law conflict in an important man-
ner, however. If a lender/owner acquires the contaminated prop-
erty without actual or constructive notice of the waste, it can
retain its immunity from CERCLA liability, even if, after dis-
covering the waste, it exercises the due care required by the
third-party defense provision.2 2 Apparently, the statutory due
care standard does not impose a duty on the owner to eliminate
the hazard, because the owner will not be liable for cleanup
costs if the government or another authorized party cleans the
site. Although the third-party defense provision expressly ex-
empts an innocent owner from liability only for response
costs, 233 thereby creating an inference that the third-party de-
fense will not protect the owner from a judicial order to clean
the site issued pursuant to section 106,234 such an interpretation
is unlikely because it could render the third-party defense mean-
ingless235 Under the common law, on the other hand, the lender/
owner will be liable for injuries caused by the hazardous con-
dition after it has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the
condition and to correct it.236 Additionally, the new owner po-
tentially will be subject to a common law action to abate the
public nuisance. 237
A court could circumvent this conflict by holding that CER-
CLA preempts the common law with respect to hazardous waste
sites. CERCLA, however, does not address personal injury ac-
tions. It deals only with the procedures for cleaning hazardous
waste sites and the mechanisms for financing cleanups, whether
the cleanup is conducted by the owner or by some other entity.
Moreover, imposing liability for personal injury and private
property damage creates an incentive for even an innocent
owner to clean the site, though this factor brings the preemption
argument back full circle. The abatement question also presents
a difficult preemption issue because EPA has identified only a
fraction of the country's waste sites for CERCLA cleanups. 238
232 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 221, § 64, at 449-50.
-3 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982).
23
- See 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[e] (1987).
236 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 366 (1979).
27 See id. § 821C.
23 EPA Seeks Comments on 64 Proposed Sites to be Added to the National Priorities
List, supra note 4, at 1725.
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The remaining waste sites could constitute public nuisances
even though EPA has not targeted them for cleanup.
The salient point is that CERCLA imposes no greater burden
on innocent landowners than the common law and, in some
regards, may impose a lesser burden. Subsection 107(a) liability
for response costs parallels the common law doctrines of strict
liability and nuisance by tying liability to property ownership
without regard to fault. The third-party defense of subsection
107(b)(3) potentially eliminates this liability for a lender/owner
by providing a circumstance under which it will be held to only
a standard of due care, rather than of strict liability. The exact
parameters of the statutory due care standard for an innocent
lender/owner, however, have yet to be defined.
IV. SCOPE OF LENDERIOWNER'S CERCLA LIABILITY
Identifying lender/owners as potential CERCLA defendants
is only the first step in assessing the Act's impact on them. In
the usual case, the lender/owner is only one of many parties
that is liable under CERCLA for response costs. Apportionment
of liability, therefore, is a salient issue and, in view of the
enormity of response costs, a very important one. Because
lenders normally are perceived as having deeper pockets than
other potential defendants, lenders will be particularly attractive
targets to a cost- conscious EPA. Part IV of this Article exam-
ines the scope of a lender/owner's liability for response costs
on two levels: (1) the amount of response costs that a court can
assess against a lender/owner in a cost recovery action; and
(2) the portion of those costs that the lender/owner can recover
from others.
In lieu of an express provision concerning the scope of section
107 liability, CERCLA applies the same standard of liability
imposed in another federal environmental act, the Clean Water
Act. 239 Like CERCLA, however, the Clean Water Act leaves
several basic liability issues open. Therefore, courts deciding
CERCLA cost recovery actions must formulate the necessary
common law. From the earliest CERCLA cases, courts have
held that federal, rather than state, common law should con-
239 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
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trol.240 Therefore, courts deciding CERCLA cases have been
free to establish the liability rules that will best serve CERCLA's
purposes unconstrained by state law.
A. Amount of Response Costs
The courts uniformly have held that a CERCLA defendant
may be held jointly and severally liable for response costs. 241
Therefore, a lender/owner sued for response costs may be liable
for the entire amount of the costs. Although some courts have
stated that the applicability of joint and several liability in a
CERCLA cost recovery action should be determined on a case-
by-case basis, 242 imposition ofjoint and several liability undoubt-
edly will be the norm when EPA institutes a cost recovery action
because this standard provides important advantages to EPA.243
First, joint and several liability significantly simplifies EPA's
pretrial investigations and its burden of establishing liability
during the trial. Rather than finding and suing each potential
240 See, e.g., Colorado v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo. 1985); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The courts
have cited a variety of sources for this proposition. See Toxic Waste Note, supra note
4, at 1526. A waste site owner is entitled to contribution not only when it has paid
EPA's response costs, but also when it has cleaned the site. See, e.g., Sand Springs
Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Okla. 1987).
4' See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083-84 & n.9 (D.
Colo. 1985); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Chem-Dyne,
572 F. Supp. at 810.
242 For economic analyses of joint and several liability, see Landes & Posner, Joint
and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); Ulen,
Hester & Johnson, Minnesota's Environmental Response and Liability Act: An Eco-
nomic Justification, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,109, 10,113 (1985); Note,
Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L.
REv. 1157, 1182-95 (1982); Note, Allocating Costs, supra note 1, at 584.
23 Although early versions of CERCLA expressly provided for joint and several
liability, the provision was deleted from the final version to ensure the Act's passage.
See 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph (D-W. Va.)); Sand
Springs Home, 670 F. Supp. at 915. SARA's legislative history indicates, however, that
Congress agreed with the courts' imposition of joint and several liability. See, e.g., 131
CONG. REc. Hi 1,073 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Eckart (D-Ohio)):
The Committee on Energy and Commerce and the other committees involved
in this bill fully subscribe to the reasoning of the court in the seminal case of
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983),
which has established a uniform Federal rule allowing for joint and several
liability in appropriate CERCLA cases .... Thus, nothing in this bill is in-
tended to change the application of the uniform Federal rule ofjoint and several
liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne court.
See also IA F. GRAD, supra note 235, § 4A-89 ("SARA, rather than directly addressing
a central issue such as the strict, joint and several standard of liability in statutory
language, makes the judicial opinions on this subject part of its legislative history.").
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section 107 defendant, EPA can choose one or more defendants
based on accessibility, ability to satisfy a judgment, and on the
facility with which EPA can establish their liability. 244 Although
a section 107 defendant may implead other potentially respon-
sible parties, it will bear the burden and expense of locating and
joining those parties and of proving their liability.2 45
Second, joint and several liability dramatically simplifies
EPA's burden of proving causation. In the absence of joint and
several liability, EPA could recover damages from a defendant
only to the extent that EPA could prove the actual amount of
damage that a particular defendant caused. This burden of proof
usually would be impossible to satisfy because it would require
EPA to establish the precise amount of each type of hazardous
substance that has been released from the waste site as well as
the identities of the generators and transporters of the hazardous
substances, the site operators, and the site owners. The variety
of activities in which potential section 107 defendants engage
compounds the problem of establishing the amount of damage
that each defendant caused.2 46
Finally, joint and several liability enhances EPA's ability to
recover all of its response costs. In the absence of joint and
several liability, EPA could recover the full amount of its re-
sponse costs only if all responsible parties could be located and
were sufficiently solvent to pay their portion of the response
costs. For all the above reasons, joint and several liability is an
appropriate common law liability doctrine for EPA response
cost recovery actions.247
244 See Dubuc & Evans, Recent Developments Under CERCLA: Toward a More
Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,197, 10,197
(1987).
245 The legislative history indicates that this was a reason for imposing joint and
several liability:
[The effect of the decision [imposing joint and several liability] was to require
the defendants, rather than the plaintiff, to show that other tortfeasors con-
tributed to the harm and in what quantities they so contributed. This incentive
to locate all other responsible parties is one of the prime considerations un-
derlying use of joint and several liability in pollution suits. In fact, in addition
to shifting the burden of proving the cause of plaintiff's injury, the court placed
on the sued defendants ultimate responsibility for bringing any other defendants
into the suit as codefendants. Facing the prospect of either proving that other
parties were also responsible for the injury or paying the full judgment them-
selves, defendants would henceforth have incentive to insure that no parties
have been inadvertently omitted from the suit.
126 CoNG. REc. 26,784 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore (D-Tenn.)).
26 Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 FLA. L. REv. 253, 263
(1986).
247 If the waste site owner or another entity specified in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982)
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B. Lender/Owners' Right to Contribution
The right to contribution may be considered the corollary of
joint and several liability. If a court holds a lender/owner jointly
and severally liable for response costs, CERCLA's goals nor-
mally will be furthered by permitting the lender/owner to recoup
all or a portion of the damages from the other responsible parties
specified in subsection 107(a).248 Thus, in addition to any other
remedies the lender/owner may have, such as insurance cover-
age or a cause of action against the former owner for misrepre-
sentation or failure to disclose a material defect in the prop-
erty,2 49 the lender/owner can sue other responsible parties for
contribution. The right to contribution is particularly important
in light of the discretion joint and several liability affords EPA.7 0
Before SARA, no clearly recognized right to sue for contri-
bution for response costs existed, particularly in light of the
relatively recent recognition in America of a right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors.251 CERCLA did not expressly create a
right of contribution, although subsection 107(e)(2) arguably
contemplated its availability: "Nothing in this subchapter...
shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any
other person subject to liability under this section ... has or
would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any
person. '"252 Although this section could be construed as applying
only to contractual rights, a few courts have permitted a con-
cleans the site and brings a cost recovery action, on the other hand, a court might
determine that the equities of the case do not justify imposition of joint and several
liability.
2" 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
7A9 Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 202, § 106; Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-disclosure, 15
TEx. L. Rav. 1, 18-21 (1936). If the lender acquired the property at a foreclosure sale,
the former owner probably will not have made any such representations and thus will
not have a duty to disclose defective conditions on the property.
250 In Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 914 (N.D. Okla.
1987), for example, EPA instituted a CERCLA administrative proceeding against a site
owner and refused the owner's request that EPA join the waste generators because of
"the emergency nature of the situation and the fact it would require a lengthy time
period to identify and join the generators in such proceedings." Similarly, in Colorado
v. ASARCO, Inc., 68&F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (D. Colo. 1985), EPA did not join hundreds
of potentially liable parties. In United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp.
59 (W.D. Mo. 1984), EPA sued only seven potentially responsible parties. Three of the
defendants each had contributed less than two percent of the waste. The defendants
filed third-party claims against 154 generators, 16 insurance companies, and 14 federal
agencies.
251 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 86-88 & nn.16-
17 (1981); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 202, § 50.
2242 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982).
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tribution action on the basis of this language alone. 25 a Other
courts have authorized such suits as a matter of federal common
law.25 4 The latter have reasoned that contribution should be a
normal concomitant of joint and several liability when the de-
fendant is not guilty of willful wrongdoing.2 55
SARA has settled the debate on the right to contribution for
response costs by expressly providing for a light of contribution
against "any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section 107(a) .... ,,256 Moreover, the new subsection
113(f) expressly provides that CERCLA contribution actions
are governed by federal law and must be brought in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This clarification is
especially helpful because not all states permit an action for
contribution among parties that are jointly and severally
liable.257
SARA's contribution provision provides relief to a CERCLA
defendant in two ways. First, it reduces a defendant's litigation
costs by eliminating the need to litigate the issue of whether a
contribution action is available.258 Second, the liberal joinder
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in conjunc-
tion with the contribution provision from SARA, provide CER-
CLA defendants with a relatively efficient and cost effective
means of pursuing other potentially liable parties. 259 The joinder
and contribution provisions minimize the time between the de-
2 Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 n.8 (D.S.C.
1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
"' United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-69 (D. Del. 1986);
ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. at 1484; United States v. Ward, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,804 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
215 See CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,395,
10,403 (1985).
6 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1982).
7 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87 n.17 (1981).
28 Although courts uniformly have granted a right to contribution for CERCLA
response costs, "the issue was continually being contested by third-party defendants."
Dubuc & Evans, supra note 244, at 10,200.
29 Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, at any time after
an action is commenced, a defendant may implead "a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." FED.
R. Civ. P. 14(a). Thus, even though the right to contribution does not vest until a person
actually pays more than her share of the damages, Rule 14(a) enables a third-party
plaintiff to establish the liability of other responsible parties in the same suit in which
EPA establishes the third-party plaintiff's liability. See, e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts
& Co., 599 F. Supp. 752 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 807 F.2d 359 (4th
Cir. 1986); Tri-Ex Enter., Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 586 F. Supp.
930 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Vaughn v. Terminal Iransp. Co., 162 F. Supp. 647, 648-49 (E.D.
Tenn. 1957).
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fendant's payment to EPA and its recovery of a portion of those
costs from the other responsible parties. Additionally, the cost
of a second trial is avoided, and the defendant avoids the pos-
sibility of inconsistent holdings on the evidence. 260
In addition to codifying the right to contribution, new subsec-
tion 113(f) adopts an equitable method of apportioning damages
among the responsible parties, 261 which should aid lender/own-
ers. Contrary to the equitable apportionment method prescribed
by subsection 113(f), the majority of courts apply a rule of pro
rata contribution.2 62 The pro rata method, in contrast, often
would result in a lender/owner bearing a share of damages dis-
proportionate to its fault. Unlike the other entities liable under
subsection 107(a)-waste generators, waste site operators, and
waste transporters263-- the innocent lender/owner will not have
actively contributed to the hazardous waste problem. Although
the lender/owner does benefit from the cleanup, that benefit
often will be of significantly less value than the lender's pro rata
share of damages.
Because of the failings of the pro rata method, the recent
trend in tort damage apportionment has been to assess damages
according to the defendant's relative degree of fault.264 New
26 Bosin v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R.R. Co., 183 F. Supp. 820, 823 (E.D.
Wis. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. Co. v. Fond du Lac,
297 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1961); 3 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 14.04, at 14-26 (2d ed. 1985). One commentator has argued that courts
usually should sever the contribution action from the government's CERCLA suit in
order to permit the government to recover its response costs in the shortest possible
time. Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 345, 367 (1985).
1' 42 U.S.C. 9613(f) (1982).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A n.h (1979). See also UNIFORM CON-
TRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(b). Under this method, if ten parties are
liable for an injury, each is responsible for ten percent of the damage award, regardless
of its relative fault.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A n.h (1979). Thus, if two people cause
an injury and one is 75 percent responsible, that person will be liable for 75 percent of
the damages. At least one state trial court has apportioned damages in a contribution
action under state hazardous waste cleanup act. In Advance Circuits, Inc. v. Carriere
Properties, File No. 84-3316 & -4591 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987), waste generators that had
generated wastes dumped at a particular site paid the cost of cleaning the site and filed
a contribution action against the site's owners and operators. The court held that the
generators were entitled to recover 70 percent of the cleanup costs from the defendants.
The court based its apportionment on its findings that: (1) the defendants' "actions and
inactions were the substantial and material contributing cause of the release and threat
of release of hazardous substances at the site"; (2) almost all the hazardous materials
on the site were by-products of the defendants' operations on the site; (3) the defendants
were "completely and uniquely responsible for the care exercised in the treatment and
storage of materials"; (4) the defendants were uncooperative with the government agen-
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subsection 113(f) adopts this more equitable approach. It pro-
vides: "In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate.1 265 This language evi-
dently contemplates that courts will consider relative fault,
which is consistent both with EPA's position concerning allo-
cation of liability266 and with the developing area of federal
contribution actions. 267 This result also addresses the concern
expressed by some legislators in considering CERCLA that joint
and several liability for response costs "may be expedient, but
it certainly flies in the face of fundamental fairness and
equity. '268
cies in dealing with the problem; and (5) one of the defendants had represented himself
as being "well-trained and expert in the area of recycling" and "implicitly aware of the
hazardous nature of the substances he was accepting and treating." On the other hand,
the court found that the plaintiff generators had (1) contributed to the release only by
relying on the defendants' representations concerning proper handling of the hazardous
materials; (2) delivered their hazardous wastes to the defendants; and (3) cooperated
with the government officials.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1982).
16 See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text. In a speech before the Environ-
mental Risks for Lenders Conference, an EPA Deputy Associate Enforcement Counsel
stated that, before suing a lender/owner under § 107, EPA will attempt to determine
whether the lender is an innocent owner. If EPA believes that a lender is innocent, EPA
will not file suit against it or will enter into a de minimis settlement with it pursuant to
§ 122(g). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g) (West Supp. 1987). Leifer Paper, supra note 26, at 5.
267 At least one federal district court has indicated that it would apportion CERCLA
damages in a contribution action. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D.S.C. 1984) ("[Alrbitrary or theoretical means of cost
apportionment do not diminish the indivisibility of the underlying harm, and are matters
more appropriately considered in an action for contribution between responsible parties
after plaintiff has been made whole."). See also Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d
400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) ("[T]he better rule is that of
contribution and indemnity on a comparative negligence basis."); Gomes v. Brodhurst,
394 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1968) ("On balance the equities inherent in a comparative
negligence system convince us of its ultimate merit."); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. 1251, 1272 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979)
("[E]quity demands consideration of the relative degrees of fault painfully evident in
this case."). Cf. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594
F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979) (using pro rata apportionment of damages because
the determination of exact degrees of fault in a complicated antitrust case would be
difficult and because pro rata contribution serves as a more effective deterrent than
comparative shares); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F.
Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 540 F.2d
27 (2d Cir. 1976) (using pro rata apportionment because the determination of comparative
shares would be too confusing in a securities fraud case in which one defendant prepared
and disseminated misleading report and was encouraged to do so by the other defendant
who was equally aware of the misleading nature of the report).
Two commentators have argued that, in addition to assessing the relative degrees of
fault in causing the harm, courts apportioning liability also should consider the degree
to which each party cooperated with the government in cleaning the site. Garber, supra
note 143, at 387-88; Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CER-
CLA, supra note 260, at 365-66.
20 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6143. See also 126 CONG. REc. 30,972
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SARA permits a court to go beyond the regular apportionment
of damages rule, however, to distribute CERCLA liability more
equitably. Under the usual apportionment rule, the plaintiff in a
contribution action can recover only that portion of the damages
that the defendants caused. 269 Thus, if a potential defendant
cannot be joined because it no longer exists, is insolvent, or is
otherwise unavailable, that party's potential contribution is sim-
ply lost. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff must bear the
portion of damages attributable to that party's actions, as well
as the portion attributable to its own share of fault.
Subsection 113(b), however, may provide courts with suffi-
cient latitude to avoid this result. In some cases, it will be
equitable and appropriate for a court to apportion the full
amount of damages among the parties to the contribution action
even if not all responsible persons have been joined. Such a
result is particularly appropriate when an attractive, though
relatively blameless, defendant, such as a lender/owner, is sad-
dled with a judgment for the full amount of response costs.
Furthermore, the possibility that the court will spread the entire
liability among the parties to the contribution action creates an
incentive for the defendants to locate other responsible parties.
Expansion of the apportionment rule will help to assure that the
costs of hazardous waste releases are borne by the parties that
cause them and will spread some of the transaction costs that
the defendant in the original response cost recovery action oth-
erwise would have to bear. Moreover, the probability of a ne-
gotiated settlement increases as the percentage of potentially
responsible parties joined in the contribution action increases.
A liberal interpretation of subsection 113(f) is consistent with
new section 122, which authorizes EPA to negotiate settlements.
To promote expeditious settlements, SARA authorizes EPA to
prepare a nonbinding preliminary allocation of responsibility
(NBAR) that allocates 100 percent of the responsibility among
the potentially responsible parties specified in subsection 107(a).
(1980) (statement of Sen. Helms (R-N.C.)) ("Retention of joint and several liability in
S. 1480 received intense and well-deserved criticism from a number of sources, since it
could impose financial responsibility for massive costs and damages awards on persons
who contributed only minimally (if at all) to a release or injury.").
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 886A(2) (1979) ("No tortfeasor can be re-
quired to make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the liability."). In
comment c, however, the Restatement states that "the court may be expected to do
what is fair and equitable under the circumstances" if, for example, one of the joint
tortfeasors is insolvent or is outside of the court's jurisdiction. Id. § 886A at comment
C.
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The statute directs EPA in preparing the NBAR to consider
inter alia "ability to pay" and "inequities and aggravating fac-
tors." 270 The inclusion of these considerations contemplates an
apportionment of liability based on considerations other than
fault and confirms that the entire liability may be assessed
against fewer than all of the potentially responsible parties.
Although EPA is still in the process of preparing guidelines
governing the allocation of liability for owners and operators, 271
it has indicated that liability for settlement purposes will not
necessarily be determined on a strict fault basis. EPA has stated,
for example, that allocation of liability to owners and operators
"is a case-specific decision based upon consideration of the
settlement criteria," such as those listed above.272 Of course,
the settlement procedures and considerations are designed to
benefit EPA by expediting settlements, thereby reducing trans-
action costs, and not necessarily to benefit potentially respon-
sible parties. New section 122 does reflect, however, that re-
sponse costs may be allocated among less than all the
responsible parties.273
Even if a court deciding a CERCLA contribution action is
willing to apportion liability based on relative degrees of fault
and to spread the entire liability among the parties before it, a
lender/owner that files a contribution action may still confront
significant obstacles. Hundreds of potentially responsible parties
may have contributed to the waste site. Joining a substantial
percentage of them will place an enormous discovery and liti-
gation burden on the lender/owner. Additionally, if the lender/
270 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1987). See also Superfund Program; Non-
binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility (NBAR), 52 Fed. Reg. 19,919 (1987).
27 The EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring has stated that guide-
lines for owners will be published in the Federal Register in April of 1988. Telephone
interview with Anna Thode, EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring,
Waste Enforcement Division (Mar. 8, 1988).
m7 Superfund Program; Non-binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility, supra
note 270, at 19,920. The EPA comments reflect an intent to incorporate the types of
factors normally considered by a court applying a pure apportionment theory. EPA's
request for comments on the NBAR procedure states, for example, that:
In general, owner/operator culpability is a significant factor in determining the
percentage of responsibility to be allocated. For example, a commercial owner
and/or operator that managed waste badly should receive a higher allocation
than a passive, noncommercial landowner that doesn't qualify as innocent. ...
The relative allocation among successive owners and/or operators may be
determined, where all other circumstances are equal, by the relative length of
time each owned and/or operated the site.
Id. New section 122, however, reveals that these factors are to be tempered by equitable
considerations. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622 (West Supp. 1987).
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622 (West Supp. 1987).
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owner impleads these parties in an EPA cost recovery action,
a court probably will sever the contribution action from the
main action pursuant to Rule 42(b), 274 on the ground that EPA
needs to recover its response costs as quickly as possible to
replenish its fund for cleanups. This efficiency rationale was a
primary reason for creating joint and several liability. Thus, the
lender/owner's recovery will be delayed, and it incurs the cost
of a second trial. In this situation, the lender/owner has strong
incentive to avoid litigation by entering into a negotiated
settlement.
Because CERCLA does not specifically address the scope of
liability, courts have the opportunity to create federal common
law tailored to serve CERCLA's goals. The enormity of the task
of rehabilitating thousands of waste sites justifies imposing joint
and several liability in an EPA cost recovery action because this
liability scheme minimizes both litigation costs and the time for
recovery of response costs, thereby furthering the cleanup ef-
fort. Perhaps most important, the specter of joint and several
liability creates a strong incentive for a party that was only
minimally involved with the site, such as a lender/owner, to
settle.
If a party is held jointly and severally liable, waste site clean-
ups and the related cost recovery actions will not be adversely
affected if courts creating the new CERCLA contribution rules
are flexible in their awards. Courts should reject pro rata ap-
portionment of liability as being too inflexible. Instead, courts
should apportion liability according to the parties' relative de-
grees of fault. In this way, a party is more likely to internalize
the full costs of its conduct, and would not be forced to inter-
nalize more than the share of costs attributable to its conduct.
Courts also should reject the equally inflexible rule that the
defendant in the initial cost recovery action must ultimately bear
liability not only for its actions, but also for the actions of all
other responsible parties that were not joined in the contribution
action. By adopting a flexible, fact-oriented approach to liability
apportionment, courts can increase the effectiveness and fair-
ness of the CERCLA liability scheme.
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V. CONCLUSION
Dumping hazardous wastes formerly appeared to be a rela-
tively cheap and convenient disposal method. It was cheap and
convenient, however, only because of the limited information
available concerning the effects of dumping. Participants in haz-
ardous waste-related industries were not required to absorb the
cost of negative externalities generated by dumping or, more
important, to prevent or to reduce such externalities by em-
ploying safe disposal methods. Catastrophes such as Love Canal
have focused national attention on the problem by dramatically
demonstrating the threat to human life and to the environment
posed by many waste sites. CERCLA authorizes EPA to clean
a leaking hazardous waste site and to recover its response costs
from those that have benefited from the dumping and cleanup
activities, including lender/owners.
The prospect of CERCLA liability surprised most lenders,
although the potential for environmentally related liability ex-
isted under other federal and state acts. The prospect is partic-
ularly alarming to lenders because the magnitude of that liability
often will substantially exceed a lender's investment in the land.
Furthermore, some lenders will feel trapped by the liability
provisions because they did not acquire the property in a vol-
untary, arms-length transaction. Normally, the lender will have
acquired the land only after other attempts to collect the debt
failed or appeared to be fruitless because of the debtor's poor
financial position. Moreover, the lender may have acquired the
land before CERCLA's effective date, so that the liability was
unanticipated.
While creating an uproar in the lending industry, CERCLA
imposes no greater liability than does established common law.
A lender is not liable under CERCLA because of its security
interest in the polluted land; it is liable because of its ownership
and control of the land. In fact, far from imposing greater lia-
bility than the common law, CERCLA imposes a lower standard
because it provides a third-party defense. A truly innocent
lender/owner, one that acquired the land without notice of the
hazardous materials, exercised due care after discovering them,
and disclosed their existence when selling the land, is not liable
under CERCLA. In contrast, the common law generally im-
poses liability on an owner for hazardous artificial conditions
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on its land regardless of whether it created them or exercised
due care.
SARA has made it significantly more difficult for lenders to
qualify for the safe harbor of the third-party defense. Institu-
tional lenders often will have difficulty satisfying SARA's sliding
standard for pre-acquisition inquiry, which is weighted to reflect
an owner's knowledge and expertise. Therefore, to avoid CER-
CLA liability as an owner, a lender must conduct a thorough
title and environmental inspection of a parcel of land before
acquiring it.275 Unless it does so, it may find itself stuck in a
quagmire from which it will be costly to escape. It is unlikely
that CERCLA liability can be avoided by acquiring the property
in the name of a nominee because courts have not permitted
defendants to hide behind corporate veils. 276
SARA established that lender/owners are potentially liable for
CERCLA response costs. The exact scope of that liability, how-
ever, has not been defined. This Article suggests that joint and
several liability is the most appropriate and effective liability
scheme to apply in response cost recovery actions. That scheme
must be tempered, however, by flexibility in the reallocation of
liability in the related contribution action. In recognition of the
differing degrees of moral culpability and active contribution to
the waste site, courts should apportion liability based on relative
degrees of fault, rather than on a rigid pro rata basis. Addition-
ally, courts should allocate the full amount of damages among
the parties to the contribution action, rather than require the
plaintiff to bear the portion of damages attributable to insolvent
or otherwise unavailable responsible parties. The courts possess
the requisite power to adopt these rules as they create the
federal common law of CERCLA, and in so doing they will
further CERCLA's goals.
25 For a discussion of the precautions a lender should take before acquiring land
through foreclosure or a negotiated settlement, see, e.g., Levitas & Hughes, Hazardous
Waste Issues in Real Estate Transactions, 38 MERCER L. REv. 581 (1987); Richman &
Stukane, supra note 13, at 13; Shea, Protecting Lenders Against Environmental Risks,
May 1987 PRAc. REAL EST. LAW. 11.
276 See supra note 190.
